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Introduction 
Traditionally, historians have focused on two major periods in America’s 
nineteenth century railroad history. The first was the initial state of railroad 
construction as typified by the 1820s efforts of Baltimore building of the Baltimore 
and Ohio Rail Road to extend its commercial and banking reach eastward. The 
second was the concentrated push following the Civil War to establish a true 
trans-continental railroad to link the western coast of the nation with the eastern 
half and to standardize rail transportation connecting North and South. In most 
cases, historians place railroad-connected communities in one of two camps 
related to the periods covered. This narrow categorization interprets communities 
as either well established and building railroads to expand their already broad 
commercial reach to other markets or as  largely fledgling municipalities 
established to either service the railroads themselves as they built to the west or 
markets established from railroad land grants to provide raw materials to fill the 
train cars heading back eastward.  
 Davenport, Iowa however, is a member of a rather unique group of 
municipalities largely located around the upper Mississippi valley in both Illinois 
and Iowa. Neither wholly established before undertaking the creation of railroads, 
nor beholden to railroads for their existence, these communities exerted 
influence on early nineteenth century railroad development far beyond what 
population and economic power would have otherwise predicted. Diving into the 
effort whole-heartedly, Davenport spearheaded a local and national drive to 
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bridge the Mississippi River and link old eastern states to new western territories. 
These railroad efforts also entangled Davenport in the grand sectional and 
economic tensions wracking the nation prior to the Civil War. What should have 
been a simple congressional effort to acquire railroad land grants spawned a 
four-year long convoluted navigation of local politics, North-South issues brought 
on by the economic possibilities of the first trans-Mississippi River bridge, and a 
simmering east vs. west economic conflict, which would erupt into land grant 
debates and help shape precedents over state sovereignty. By the end of the 
Civil War, a tired, broke, and largely disillusioned Davenport would cease to tie 
its whole future to railroads largely outside of its own control, and instead 
concentrate on finding its next road to prosperity. 
Local and regional historians have examined Davenport’s involvement in 
all these events, but largely only in passing. John Larson briefly goes over 
Davenport’s part in Iowa’s legacy of railroad law in his essay “Iowa’s Struggle for 
State Railroad Control” in Marvin Bergman’s Iowa History Reader. Davenport’s 
part in the essay is however minimal as it concentrates on the much later 
Granger and Populist periods of the struggle. Even the prolific and incredibly 
talented Iowa railroad historian Frank P. Donovan minimizes Davenport’s efforts 
to attract, build, and fund the Mississippi & Missouri Railroad and the Rock Island 
Line Railroad, instead focusing his attention on the relationships between the 
railroad companies themselves. These scholarly interpretations are not willful 
oversights, but are typical of the place given to Davenport in subjects of much 
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broader scope. Authors generally focus on the railroads themselves or wrap 
Davenport’s efforts into the larger history of the region. This focus has caused 
the voice of the city at a pivotal point in its history to be drowned out. This is 
unfortunate, as Davenport has left a rather substantial, if admittedly somewhat 
narrow, base of records for the period. An early and prolific series of 
newspapers, relatively intact city records, and preserved internal documents from 
the president’s offices of both railroads have provided a voice for city relatively 
rare in an area largely considered the frontier until after the Civil War.1 
This examination owes a great deal of debt to three other works only 
indirectly connected to its topics. Shelton Stromquist’s “Town Development, 
Social Structure, and Industrial Control,” again in the Iowa History Reader, 
highlights as one of its examples Burlington, a town tied into much of Davenport’s 
early railroad history and mirrors in many ways the social trajectory of 
town/railroad co-influence that occurs in Davenport. Both cities had just enough 
development time prior to bringing a railroad into town that their commercial and 
social elites had time to independently establish themselves before railroad 
money and interests overwhelmed them. In many ways, this time allowed both 
groups to set the terms of their initial involvement, but also limited the railroads’ 
investment in the community thus making it easier to redirect investments to 
cities where they did have more control. On the economic end, Timothy R. 
Mahoney’s “Urban History in a Regional Context: River Towns on the Upper 
                                                          
1
 John L. Larson, “Iowa’s Struggle for State Railroad Control” in Iowa History Reader, ed. Robert Bergman 
(Iowa City, University of Iowa Press, 2008), 159-198; Roger H. Grant, ed, Iowa Railroads, (Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 2000), 168-202;  
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Mississippi, 1840-1860” in the Journal of American History helps to answer 
where much of the business before, during, and after the railroad’s construction 
flowed from and to. He finds the Upper Mississippi towns in Iowa unique as well, 
poised to take advantage of transient opportunities to forge themselves into 
business centers far quicker than the general population of the area would 
account for, but also leaving themselves open to reduced importance as the 
frontier line of the nation moved past the Mississippi. Finally, this examination 
also owes a debt to the pioneering work of Robert W. Fogel’s Railroads and 
American Economic Growth. His thorough analysis of the economics that were 
driving, or more accurately not driving, the expansion of railroads in the early 
nineteenth century opens up the question of why Americans built these railroads. 
If, as Fogel argues, the Iowa, Nebraska and Illinois territories would have 
remained largely undeveloped without the existence of the railroads, Davenport’s 
overwhelming desire to be Iowa’s first railroad crossing makes good historical 
sense.2  
Historians need to examine more closely regional economic and social 
forces in the context of railroad construction in the buildup to the trans-
continental years. Even an amazing recent work on the transcontinental 
railroads, Richard White’s Railroaded, largely neglects this early period of 
Midwestern railroad construction. This is surprising in that at least one of the 
                                                          
2
 Shelton Stormquist, “Town Development, Social Structure, and Industrial Conflict,” in Iowa History 
Reader, ed, Robert Bergman (Iowa City, University of Iowa Press, 2008), 159-196; Timothy R. Mahoney, 
“Urban History in a Region Context,” Journal of American History, Vol. 72, No. 2 (1985), 318-339; Robert 
Fogel, Railroads and American Economic Growth (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1964).  
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principal directors of the Union Pacific, and the Credit Mobilier Corporation that 
backed it, cut his teeth on railroad finance, management, and stock fraud with the 
Rock Island Line and the Mississippi & Missouri railroad.  
If, as postulated by Fogel, construction of the railroads was not inevitable 
then something other than pure economics was driving their creation in 
Davenport. Additionally, if Davenport’s railroads were not a dry run for the later 
successful linking of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroads, as implied by 
White, then something unique was happening in Davenport and other 
Midwestern cities.  
In order to address this gap, at least in the context of Davenport, this 
thesis looks at four general issues. It first examines why a river town in a location 
of very little commercial consequence rose to a position to influence rail 
construction in two states. Secondly, the thesis explores the influence, both 
financial and organizational, that small towns such as Davenport could muster in 
the context of railroad construction in a neighboring state. Third, it explains the 
state and national implications of the land grant efforts of these Midwestern 
railroad hotbeds, and how the conflict between cities and states over railroad 
issues boiled over into the brewing sectional conflict of the Civil War. Finally, it 
will address, at least in Davenport’s case, how overwhelming economic and 
political issues displaced these towns from reaping, at least the level they had 
envisioned, the benefits from the very railroads they helped to create.
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Chapter 1. 
Imagining a River Crossing Town 
A great many factors influenced whether frontier towns experienced 
success or failure in the antebellum period. While factors such as weather 
patterns or national scale population movements were out of their hands, others 
were more under control of settlers themselves. Two of the most critical were the 
location of a town and the ambition of its citizens to develop the city into a 
commercial center. The relationship between Davenport and the railroad and the 
history of Davenport preceding and following settlement must be examined to 
understand how it came into being and transformed into a frontier hotbed of 
railroad building. Taking this long view allows the historian to take note of factors 
that encouraged and shaped development. Of particular interest is the pre-
settlement role the future site of Davenport played in shaping the character of the 
city. Likewise, the people and events of the first decade of the city’s life 
influenced the city’s future economic and political relationships in substantial 
ways for decades to come. Each, location and people, deserves our attention in 
turn.   
Location 
If viewed by a traveler prior to 1830, Davenport’s site would be largely 
unremarkable and simply another scenic point on Upper Mississippi River Valley. 
Sailing up river, after passing the somewhat ramshackle town of Keokuk, our 
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traveler would have come upon a long stretch of mostly uninhabited riverfront. As 
the river meandered in short jaunts east and west, the occasional Native 
American village would have been interspaced with tall bluffs and wooded 
patches. Eventually, the river would have taken a long east to west course where 
our traveler would pass not one but two logical locations for towns. The first of 
these was located just before the east-west jog in the river, the eventual site of 
Muscatine, and the second where a midsized island, close to the eastern shore, 
interrupted the river. The island itself would have shown signs of habitation in a 
manner comfortable to our fictitious traveler. A small, but active, farm on the 
island sat in the shadow of a military fort. Fort Armstrong, established following 
the War of 1812 to control the upper Mississippi, passed its usefulness in the 
previous decade and had been allowed to decay into a mere shadow of itself. On 
the eastern shore lay a Sauk Indian village in various states of habitation 
depending on when our traveler would have sailed. A rather non-descript flood 
plain with bluffs rising rapidly to the north and a much more gentle grade the west 
occupied the western shore of the river. For the astute observer, however, one 
notable feature of the river here would have stood out. Here was a point where 
the mighty Mississippi could be crossed with relative ease, at least compared too 
much of the river to the south. With the island breaking up both the flow of the 
river and providing a midpoint resting place, it was relatively simple to canoe 
across the expanse of the river. Depending on the season, other advantages 
also became apparent. The cold winters here often afforded travelers a relatively 
safe ice passage across, and dry summers even occasionally allowed a passible, 
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if somewhat treacherous, foot crossing. It was in fact this domination of the river 
by the island, and the ease of controlling river crossings at this point, which 
attracted the U.S. government in the wake of the war of 1812, and led it to 
construct Fort Armstrong on Rock Island itself in 1815. Even then, the fort only 
garrisoned a maximum of 200 soldiers, usually considerably less. With no white 
settlement on the Illinois bank until 1828, there was little to protect. Beyond this 
strategic point, however, little perked the interest of the federal government. No 
legitimate American settlements yet existed for hundreds of miles north or south 
along the river and even parts of the Illinois territory to the east remained in 
Native American hands. The western bank of the Upper Mississippi at this 
location, besides acting as gateway into Native American held lands for pelt 
traders, had little to draw American’s attention, legitimate or otherwise, to the 
area.3 
Until 1830, settlers lacked interest in the upper west bank of the 
Mississippi River. Confusing Indian claims complicated land titles, shifting 
European claims of ownership and influence, and the difficulties in crossing the 
Mississippi all produced an isolated frontier in the Upper Mississippi River Valley 
unattractive to all but the most self-sufficient of settlers. An initial burst of trading 
settlements had shot up the river from New Orleans to St. Louis, encouraged by 
the succession of European claimants to the area, prior to the American 
Revolution. However, past this point, both in space and time, very little non-
                                                          
3
 D. W. Flagler, A history of the Rock Island Arsenal from its establishment in 1836 to December 
1876 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1877), 18-22. 
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native settlement proceeded. The United States’ acquisition of the area did little 
to accelerate settlement. In fact, by the time Missouri gained statehood in 1830, 
only approximately 140,455 white settlers called the entire Upper Mississippi 
River Valley home, and the vast majority of this non-native settlement was 
located along the lower Mississippi and Missouri rivers, from New Orleans to 
around what would become Kansas City. Settlement up river beyond St. Louis                                                                                                                   
had reached at its furthest point where the Des Moines River joined the 
Mississippi. What little American and European settlement existed concentrated 
around the unofficial American settlement of Keokuk. Settled by U.S. army 
frontier officers unwilling to abandon their Native American wives after a general 
order from the War Department in the 1820s, Keokuk was an American 
settlement in name only. The eastern bank of the Mississippi did                                                                                                             
not fare much better. Settlement of the area had just barely begun, with Illinois 
becoming a U.S. state in 1818, and the majority of American interest in settling 
the region concentrated the more accessible lower Mississippi and to a lesser 
extent, those access ways that connected to the Great Lakes. Even by the 
1830s, the Illinois bank of the Mississippi River had only managed to average a 
non-native settlement rate of two people per square mile.4 
                                                          
4
 One notable exception to the lack of previous interest to the Upper Mississippi Valley was the 
settlement of Dubuque, which had attracted Europeans at various times due to the ease of mining 
lead deposits at this location. Greg A. Ludvigson and James A. Dockal, Iowa Department of 
Natural Resources, “Lead and Zinc Mining in the Dubuque Area”, accessed June 29, 1830,1 
http://www.iowadnr.gov/portals/idnr/uploads/geology/LeadZincMiningDubuqueArea.pdf; William J. 
Petersen, “To the Land of Black Hawk,” The Palimpsest, February 1933: 55-57. 
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This lack of settlement did not mean the area, particularly Davenport’s 
future home, was completely unnoted by Americans prior to 1830. The Pikes 
Peak expedition had briefly encamped at the location following its crossing of the 
river on its way west. Settlers and western boosters had also eyed the 
interruption of the river by the island as a potential crossing point. A particular 
brand of American visionary was always pushing the nation’s population to move 
unsettled locations, such as the future site of Davenport, far ahead of the realistic 
possibility of people doing so. William C. Redfield, one such booster, went as far 
to publish a travel book describing the location as a logical point for a railroad 
crossing in 1828. His foresight for this use of the area is remarkable because the 
Baltimore and Ohio, one of the earliest eastern railroad lines built in America, 
was only in the planning stages at this time, and would not begin construction for 
nearly another two years. Even before settlement began, Davenport gathered the 
weight of a future behind it. First, however, the United States would need a right 
and reason to lay claim to area. Tragically, one would soon present itself.5 
The Black Hawk War and the Acquisition of Iowa 
The Black Hawk War between the United States and Chief Blackhawk’s 
tribe did not begin over the territory that would eventually make up the eastern 
portion of Iowa, and by all rights should not have occurred. Chief Black Hawk, 
reacting to outright theft of lands in Illinois still settled by his people during the 
hunting season, initiated a raid into western Illinois in reprisal. The government, 
                                                          
5
 Judy Norris, “Where Railroads Began,” The Sunday Dispatch, Sept 27, 1987. 
11 
 
and the settlers of the Illinois territory, reacted brutally. After a small number of 
largely one-sided engagements in the Americans’ favor, Army forces cornered 
and attacked Black Hawk’s troop, including their encamped women and children 
them with no pretense of diplomacy, crushing both their fighting ability and moral 
and ending the conflict. Wishing to complete and legitimize its claim to the lands 
east of the Mississippi and begin the process opening the lands to west for 
settlement, the government made token remuneration to the tribes involved, both 
friendly and hostile. In exchange for their claim to lands on both the eastern and 
western sides of the river, the federal government paid $655,000 in cash, broken 
out into yearly stipends over the next decade to the Sauk, Meskwaki, and Ho-
Chunk and various other participant nations. This worked out to only around 
fourteen cents an acre. As further compensation, the treaty granted many of the 
tribes in the area land just outside of this swath, to which most of the tribes 
removed. Thanks to the conflict, the federal government settled Native American 
claims on the eastern shore of the river and gained legal access to a vast new 
territory encompassing nearly the entire eastern border of the state of Iowa to a 
depth of 50 miles. Stretching down nearly to Keokuk and northward to nearly to 
what would become the Wisconsin border, this new land opened the paths to the 
west. Only the logistics of fulfilling the treaty proved troublesome. Providing the 
tribes with the yearly cash and goods stipend from the eastern side of the 
Mississippi River, or distant Keokuk, would have been problematic. Quickly, 
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however, the new town of Davenport provided a ready solution for disbursing the 
treaty obligations.6 
Establishing Davenport 
Davenport, in many ways, is a city where all of the right forces came 
together to make settlement nearly inevitable in a location with no overtly 
compelling feature. Separately, any one of these forces might have produced a 
minor settlement or even a small trade town, but taken together they provided a 
much stronger push for Davenport to develop faster and more aggressively into a 
regional market center. Each deserves a brief examination in turn. 
The Blackhawk Treaty was one of these forces, and essentially enabled 
all of the others. Treaty agreements at the conclusion of the Black Hawk War 
allowed Native American tribes to grant title to land in limited amounts to 
American citizens to settle debts or express gratitude for prior friendship. This 
would prove critical to the founding of Davenport. Antoine LeClaire, a frontier 
trader and interpreter for the U.S. government, his wife Marguerite, a Dr. Spence, 
and a Mr. McCloud benefitted from a land cessation by Chief Keokuk of the Sauk 
along the eastern bank of the Mississippi. One stipulation of this grant was 
critically important. As a condition to take possession of the land granted to his 
                                                          
6
 Charles J. Kipper, “Treaty with the Sauk and Foxes,” Indian Treaties, 1778-1883 (New York: 
Hinterland Publishing, 1970), 253-255; For a full account of the Black Hawk War and its 
repercussions, see Patrick J. Jung’s, The Black Hawk War of 1832, (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2008). Additionally, in spite of claims the work is heavily influenced by its 
editor’s voice, the autobiography of Black Hawk, The Life of Black Hawk, (Chicago: Donnelley & 
Sons, 1916) is a must read for anyone wishing to understand the Sauk side of the conflict; 
Petersen, “To the Land of Black Hawk,” 53. 
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wife Marguerite, LeClaire was required to build a treaty house on the site of the 
negotiations and reside in it. LeClaire promptly built the treaty house and shortly 
thereafter bought out the claims of Dr. Spencer and Mr. McCloud for one 
hundred and fifty dollars after a quarrel threatened to cripple headway on 
consolidating the claim and clearing the titles for future sale. Thus, the future site 
for the city of Davenport was promptly in private hands and had already taken on 
minor commercial importance from the moment the land came fully into American 
possession.7 
The obligations imposed on the United State government by Black Hawk 
War were a compounding factor for accelerating initial settlement of future site of 
Davenport. The yearly stipends, consisting of not only cash but solid goods and 
rations as well, to the Native Americans needed a common point for 
disbursement, and no truly satisfactory location was available at hand. The U.S. 
Army had largely abandoned Fort Armstrong on Rock Island prior even to the 
Black Hawk War and had allowed it to decay nearly uselessness. Only a small 
token military force of 80 men had remained on the island. The only civilian 
settlement was George Davenport, its former quartermaster and one of the 
founding settlers of Rock Island, IL just across the river, who had remained on 
the island following release from the Army to maintain his farm and work as a 
trader for the American Fur Company. Having noted his previous experience at 
the fort, the Army re-commissioned George Davenport at the rank of coronel into 
service as quartermaster and interpreter for the government’s forces during the 
                                                          
7
 Franc B. Wilkie, Davenport Past and Present (Davenport: Luse, Lane & Co., 1858), 32. 
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Black Hawk War, after which he had become a vocal critic of the Army’s tactics in 
the conflict. The treaty granted him a small land allotment of his own on what 
would become the Iowa side, and he looked to advance his interests there. 
Negotiations and shared interests led Davenport and LeClaire into forming a 
business relationship to fulfill treaty obligations and sell supplies at the city of 
Davenport to Native American bands. This relationship remained until Col. 
Davenport’s murder in 1844, and then continued as a family connection by his 
son.8 
Davenport’s initial settlement was, however, problematic. The location was 
for the most part wholly unremarkable for American settlement beyond the 
presence of the Treaty House. Without a ready resource for extraction and much 
easier access overall to water transportation into the interior of the territory 
available in other locations, the only significant feature available was the ease of 
crossing the river. To facilitate access to the area, LeClaire established one of 
the first regular ferry services across the Mississippi in what would become Iowa 
in 1834, connecting the yet unnamed town of Davenport with the newly 
established town of Stephenson, IL, the precursor town of Rock Island. In 
addition to the ease of access provided by both the natural course of Mississippi 
and ferry service to the Iowa side, relatively clear titles available for much of the 
land involved should have been more attractive then they initially were. By 1835, 
in anticipation of the advantages of the location being enough to attract settlers, 
                                                          
8
 Antoine LeClaire, Keo Kuck & Band Due to Antoine Le Claire, August 24, 1836, LeClaire 
Collection: Financial Records 1836-1838, Putnam Museum, Davenport; Several of the earliest 
papers show joint purchases and sales of typical goods sold to Native American. 
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LeClaire, Davenport, and other partners formed a land company and laid out the 
plots for Davenport. Perhaps fearing that his non-Anglican name would put off 
potential buyers, LeClaire sold the initial settlement site to the company for 
$1,750 and a one-eighth interest in the location as a whole. This initial land sale 
did not go as well as hoped. The auction itself only attracted a small number of 
potential buyers, with the majority of them being land speculators from St. Louis. 
All told, only about 60 of the available 300 lots sold, most of them below the 
asking price to speculators and not settlers. Those few plots that did sell were 
land primarily owned outright by LeClaire, where risk of a muddied title was 
insignificant. Davenport, LeClaire, and the rest of the company were left holding 
far more land than planned after the sale. In order profit from it, they would have 
to develop a town on their own to increase interest. To that end, LeClaire and the 
rest of the company plotted and named the city of Davenport in May of 1836.9 
Growing Davenport 
Creating a town from scratch in Iowa, even during the rapid westward 
expansion years of 1835-1840, was no easy feat. Simply attracting settlers was a 
challenge as LeClaire, Davenport, and their settlement company had discovered. 
More established western states possessed plenty of available room and were 
more attractive to second wave settlers not looking for a pure frontier experience. 
Iowa was not alone in this problem. The semi-settled Illinois hinterlands, even 
aided by the explosive growth of Chicago, had only gained 318,738 people. 
                                                          
9
 Wilkie, Davenport Past and Present, 32-34. 
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Missouri, much of whose territory was more of frontier settling similar to Iowa, 
increased by fewer than 250,000 people even with the advantage of the city of 
St. Louis. Iowa, initially part of the Wisconsin Territory, was closed to white 
settlement prior to 1833, and possessed no official white population outside of 
Keokuk prior to this. By the first census taken in 1836, Iowa only had 11,491 
Americans residing in the state, most of which were located in Des Moines 
County. Even by 1840, the population of the state had grown only to 43,112 
people, of which a mere 396 lived in Scott County, spread among the towns of 
Davenport, Rockingham, and LeClaire.10 
LeClaire was determined to make something of his holdings even if the 
land did not sell immediately. In order to attract business from St. Louis, he 
established the LeClaire House, which served as a hotel and retreat from 
mosquito borne diseases that seasonally plagued the Missouri city. With its 
geography of bluffs and non-swampy flood plains, Davenport was ideal for 
preventing large-scale mosquito borne disease outbreaks. Interestingly, 
Davenport constructed his hotel far above the size and apparent needs of the 
area, even considering the potential tourism draw. However, LeClaire’s 
connections in St. Louis allowed him to promote successfully the location as a 
summer retreat from the malarial season. Such vacationing, trade with the Native 
                                                          
10
 “1836 Census of Iowa,” accessed January 14, 2012, USGenWeb, 
http://iagenweb.org/census/1836/#totals. Note, in the 1836 census Iowa only had two counties, 
Des Moines and Du Buque(sp), roughly encompassing the upper and lower halves of the Iowa 
portion of the Wisconsin Territory; “Scott, IA 1840 Federal Census,” accessed January 14, 2012, 
IAGenWeb, http://files.usgwarchives.net/ia/scott/census/1840/index.txt. 
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American bands still in the area, and a smattering of early farming settlers, 
provided Davenport with a basic economy on which to build. 11 
Becoming the center 
One key to ensuring the success of a town in the frontier of was 
establishing it as the center of local governmental services. Even small state 
government agencies, such as county seats and courthouses, tended to focus 
regional population on a town and in turn drew both industry and commerce to 
serve this concentrated population. The founders of every town realized the 
advantages of such an arrangement and competed fiercely in contests of varying 
types to secure their town as host to these services. The state of Iowa favored 
using elections to determine the placement of its county seats between towns 
roughly in the geographic center of counties, reasoning that the town able to 
muster the most population to vote was already the natural center. These 
elections often drew towns into questionable alliances, even reaching across 
proposed county lines, and led to some of the more colorful early political 
contests in the state. 
The first such contest Davenport involved itself in was in fact outside its 
own immediate proposed county area. The U.S. government largely left the 
formation of county boundaries up to local governments and the territorial 
congresses that oversaw them, under the assumption that locals would be more 
                                                          
11
 Ambrose Cowperthwaite Fulton, A Life’s Voyage (New York: Ambrose Cowperthwaite Fulton, 
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apt to identify logical natural or political boundaries for services. This presented 
politically connected and well-organized communities with opportunities to seize 
the trade that simply hosting court functions could bring. However, unless 
particularly politically powerful municipality was already in place there were a few 
conditions that perspective county seats needed to fulfill. Where possible state 
politicians situated county seats near the geographic center of the county itself 
and used natural boundaries to set a county’s shape. Additionally state officials 
tended to select larger population centers for courthouses in areas without firm 
boundaries, the county drawn out around them if possible. This meant that the 
size and shape of a neighboring county, and the location of its courthouse, could 
have a great deal of influence on adjoining ones, influencing which towns were 
considered to be in the geographic center. In the case of Cedar County, the city 
of Tipton wished to became the county seat. The Davenport city fathers realized 
fixing the geographic bounds of Cedar county around Tipton placed Davenport 
near the center of the proposed Scott County and lent all due support to Tipton’s 
ambitions. Tipton’s efforts prevailed and leading commissioners drew the county 
lines in the manner that shaped Scott County to favor Davenport as its seat. 
However, there proved to be another community who wished to become the seat 
of the county. Rockingham was a sister community to Davenport, established by 
many of their own eminent settlers, and heavily contested the county seat that 
Davenport sought with a tenacity that proved problematic. 
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In February of 1838, the territorial government held an election to 
determine the location for Scott County’s courthouse and seat. Un-coincidentally, 
the political efforts for both sides would involve most of the primary organizers 
involved in the future railroad efforts, although on differing sides. Davenport’s 
rival for the courthouse was the town of Rockingham located just a few miles 
south. Davenport claimed its position at the center of the county’s shore along 
the Mississippi river edge gave it the natural lead in being the logical location for 
governmental services in. Rockingham, championed by Ebenezer Cook, William 
Barrows, and George Sargent, claimed it had a greater transportation advantage, 
as it was located across the Mississippi from the Illinois mouth of the Rock River, 
granting navigable access into the adjoining state. With the stakes potentially as 
high as the long-term survival of either town, both sides looked for any advantage 
they could muster in the upcoming election. Typical of territorial elections in the 
fluid population of the American frontier, both side quickly realized by importing 
additional temporary “residents” in for the election, they might be able to sway 
the vote enough to ensure victory. Davenport proponents sent men up river to 
the mining camps of Dubuque for “eligible” voters, while Rockingham reached 
deep into Cedar County’s lumber camps, with both cities mustering what allies 
they could across the river in Illinois. Davenport alone spent $3000 on acquiring 
its “voters.” An expectedly chaotic election occurred, with both sides’ “voters” 
treating it like an alcohol-fueled festival. Following a count of the votes cast, 
Davenport appeared to have won the contest, which surprised the larger 
Rockingham, which lead them to protest the entire election to the territorial 
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governor. After examining the election, state officials declared the election 
invalid, having determined that both sides had illegally inflated their eligible voter 
numbers. While this outcome nominally produced a draw, Rockingham ended up 
ahead in this initial conflict. The territorial legislature selected Rockingham as the 
location of the county commissioner’s election in absence of an established 
county seat. This meant that government services would begin originating from 
that town, at least on a temporary basis. 12 
Matters of location, especially in governance, could not be left unsettled 
however. In the summer of 1838, Davenport and Rockingham again clashed over 
the issue of gaining the county seat. On guard for population puffing, and 
knowing that the other community watched them just as hard as they were 
watching their rival, both towns resorted to legitimate means for increasing voter 
numbers in their town. City boosters with land holdings deeply discounted land 
plots for sale, or gave them away entirely, to attract settlers to the towns. As was 
typical of such close and heated elections, propaganda and character attacks 
began in earnest between the two towns, each decrying the disadvantages of the 
other. Into the center of this political melee stepped the county’s first printer, Mr. 
A. Logan. Foreshadowing Davenport’s thirst for internal improvements, the city 
made lucrative concessions to attract Mr. Logan to their town. The newly 
established Davenport and Rock Island newspaper quickly went on to espouse 
the advantages of Davenport as the center of the county. Despite this seeming 
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advantage, Rockingham won the next round of voting by 15 votes. A last ditch 
investigatory effort by Davenport’s supporters proved fraud on twenty of the 
votes, casting the issue back into question. This resulted in a two-year long legal 
battle over the location of the county commissioners and seat.13 
While this display of tenacity by Davenport is fascinating, and useful to 
understanding the underlying drives that eventually allowed it to build railroads, 
far more enlightening is the manner in how the contest ended. By 1840, both the 
city of Rockingham and Davenport had tired of the contest, but in differing 
manners. Rockingham had largely failed to grow over preceding two years, due 
to persistent flooding hampering development. Davenport, however, decided to 
end the contest more decisively, and offered to absorb the expense of 
constructing the county courthouse in exchange for being the county seat’s 
permanent location. Rockingham, having reached the limits of its political will and 
no longer in possession of an economic base able to match that of Davenport, 
agreed to drop its claim. It is one of the first instances of Davenport’s citizens 
being willing to marshal local resources in the face of regional hesitation, self-
funding and completing a large internal improvement project for only tenuous 
future returns. The potentially largest of these, the construction of two railroads, 
and the bridge across the Mississippi that bound them, would soon enter the 
picture.14 
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Chapter 2. 
Davenport Reaches East: The Rock Island Line 
A Brief History of the Name of the Rock Island Line 
Shakespeare famously wrote, “… a rose by any other name would smell 
just as sweet.” This quote is quite apropos when dealing with rail lines, because 
these companies had many names over their lifetimes. Typically the beginning 
and terminus of the line, with important stops in the middle sometimes listed, 
determined a railroad company’s title. As a railroad grew, its name would often 
evolve, incorporating cities or regions that it connected to, making for confusing 
switches of terminology and complicating sourcing of documents. “The Rock,” as 
its came to be known was no different. For our purposes the “Rock Island & 
LaSalle,” “Rock Island & Chicago” (1854), and the “Chicago, Rock Island and 
Pacific” (1866) railroads are all synonyms for the same incorporated railroad. 
These are all titles the road, and its tributaries, held over the period examined. 
For the curious, further names include the “Chicago, Rock Island, and Texas 
Railway Company” (1893), “The Rock Island” (1902) and again “The Chicago, 
Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad Company” (1948) ,also known simply as “The 
Rock”, until its dissolution in 1980. To ease identification, the term “Rock Island 
Line” will most commonly identify the line.15 
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Davenport’s Transportation Worries 
As the first decade of settlement closed, Davenport’s founders looked at a 
world changing around them and feared for the future of their city. Winning the 
county seat had ensured the town prosperity simply due to the local trade and 
traffic but only a modest one. River business, both steamboats along the 
Mississippi and cross-river ferry, was light in nature and mostly consisted of high 
value goods coming into the city mostly from St. Louis, with grain crops of 
modest value and lumber sold down river. Indian trade, which sustained several 
local merchants, slowing faded out due to government efforts to extinguish 
Native American land claims via new treaties. As more tribes relocated across 
the Mississippi, Davenport merchants could no longer count on their purchases 
to boost profits. Even new settlers were slow to immigrate to the city. Most 
immigrants stopped in Illinois before they reached the Mississippi River, if coming 
west, or in Missouri, if coming from the South. Local industry was slowly building, 
a series of steam flour mills primarily, but not nearly as quickly as in the rival city 
of Burlington  down the Mississippi to the south. These worries nagged at 
Davenport’s businessmen even as the city enjoyed modest growth over the 
decade. 
 By 1845, it was clear relying on river transportation for trade was not 
bringing the growth the city of Davenport desired. Lucrative steamships and other 
river transportation often failed the city in months when it needed goods the 
most. The Mississippi regularly froze over from December to February, 
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depending on the intensity of the winter, making large-scale transportation 
difficult. Ice typically locked boats, and any good they were carrying at the time, 
in the last port they managed to reach. Typically, several boats in a season 
would get ice locked on the river itself, while attempting one last run. Summer 
traffic was just as unreliable. Water levels at the height of summer occasionally 
dropped to points only the shallowest drafted flatboats could manage, which 
confined heavy steamships to the better-fed lower Mississippi. Davenport did not 
see these problems as insurmountable, simply frustrating. City and regional 
boosters made many attempts to interest the Federal government in making 
improvements on the Mississippi, particularly the rapids just north of Davenport. 
A general disinterest in national involvement in most internal improvements, 
however, prevented any real traction on the issue. Davenport also worried 
heavily about inland traffic issues. Despite possessing rather favorable terrain for 
urban growth and river trade, their potential was somewhat stymied. Lacking any 
waterway into the inland of Iowa, or capital to build an improved road inland, 
growth towards the interior was slow. Rival cities Keokuk, Burlington, and, to a 
lesser extent, Muscatine all possessed ready access to rivers cutting into the 
interior of the state. These cities counted on upriver settlement to draw settlers 
towards them, promising an outlet for their crops to St. Louis markets even if they 
did not settle in the city proper.16 
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 The city of Davenport clearly needed an advantage that would allow 
growth to accelerate dramatically. According to local lore, a momentous meeting 
took place in 1845 on the farm of Col. Davenport. Leading members of the town, 
including A.C. Fulton, Antoine LeClaire, and James Grant, along with a number 
of individuals from Illinois, such as civil engineer Richard Morgan, gathered at 
Col. Davenport’s house on Rock Island to plan Davenport’s future. Judge Grant 
opened the meeting, regaling those gathered with his vision of Davenport as a 
gateway to the West, saying, “It falls to our lot to forge an important link in the 
great chain across the continent...These railroads that are projecting their lines 
across the continent from the East are even now looking for an outlet to this vast 
waterway…” This grand plan was to tie the economic futures of Davenport and 
Rock Island together by leveraging the capital and energy of both their cities to 
build not one, but two railroads and a bridge to link them across the Mississippi. 
The hopes and dreams of two cities rested on these words. The ambitions of 
Davenport and Rock Island lay bare. 17 
 Why a rail line and not some other mean of commerce, such as an 
improved ferry or enhanced local steamship service? Simply put, Davenport did 
not trust its future in the hands of others or in movable improvements. Ownership 
of the ferry monopoly operating between Rock Island and Davenport had quickly 
becoming an issue. Both cities maneuvered to keep ownership, and therefore 
influence the rates charge for transport on it, of the ferry located in their 
respective city. Additionally, Iowans in general had sought a cross-river railway 
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connection and Davenport wished to be the first. In many ways, a race was on 
between the emerging major river cities to secure a rail connection eastward. 
Citizens of Dubuque petitioned the federal government to assist in building a 
railroad bridge at their location as early as 1837. Davenport had either to act 
immediately or face losing the bridge and traffic to another city. Dubuque 
maneuvered to take the bridge location, on the strength of the Galena Line under 
construction on the opposite shore. Other cities, such as Burlington organized to 
find engineering solutions, which would allow bridging of the river as well. 
Chicago railroads were conflicted on the location where the Mississippi should be 
crossed, and agreed only that one of them must cross it quickly. Chicago was in 
their own race to ensure control of the east / west railroad traffic against more 
established eastern cities and lines. Further, Chicago wished to bite into the 
control of the river traffic exerted by St. Louis steamboat cartels. 18 
Both cities planned to tie their future to a railroad that did not exist yet, one 
they would have to build. Or, more accurately two railroads, the eventual Chicago 
& Rock Island and Mississippi & Missouri Railroads. While conceived as one 
continuous route, it was broken into two separate companies for financing and 
construction. The planners did so because acquiring a charter for a single line 
across both states was much more complex than two separate lines linked by 
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ownership and based in each respective state. While less directly connected to 
Davenport, an examination Rock Island Line will proceed first as the Mississippi 
and Missouri Line is much less significant without its sister railroad. 
The Birth of the Chicago & Rock Island Line 
 As the 1840s proceeded, it was increasingly clear that Chicago was 
becoming a railroad hub. Access to New York via the Great Lakes, a connection 
to the Mississippi River via the planned Chicago & Galena Line, and a web of 
planned railroads reaching from the east ensured its place as a mercantile 
center. There was still the issue, however, of reaching past the Mississippi. The 
logical point, where a rail line was nearly complete, was the Galena, IL and 
Dubuque, IA crossing in upper Iowa. The Galena crossing had a problem, 
however, insurmountable at the time, the sheer breadth of the Mississippi. Nearly 
1800 feet in width at that point, engineers considered the river unbridgeable 
without unreasonable costs. To the south, however, there was an alternative both 
within an acceptable distance of Chicago and much more easily bridgeable. The 
Rock Island, IL and Davenport, IA crossing had a width of less than 1,580 ft., and 
an island to provide mid river footings. This was a much brighter prospect 
engineering-wise as a bridge location. There were also local executives and 
politicians set to ease a railroad into existence as well. However, conceiving of a 
railroad and actually constructing one were two completely different endeavors. 
The later took quite a bit more effort. 
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Building the Rock Island Line immediately ran into several problems. The 
first was a lack of interest from the Illinois state government. Illinois had 
participated enthusiastically in the canal frenzy of the 1830s, building a state 
owned canal from just outside of Chicago to the city of LaSalle. This complicated 
the plans for the railroad. To reach Chicago along the route with the best grade, 
the railroad had to follow the canal’s route. Doing so competed directly with the 
state-owned improvement. Furthermore, Illinois was protective of its canal 
investment and wary of anything that might diminish their return. Funding this 
canal had not been a smooth endeavor. The panic of 1837 caused canal 
construction to require more funding then provided by federal land grant profits 
by a considerable margin. This left the state of Illinois to pick up the remainder, or 
have a near worthless half-completed canal on its hands. Heavily laden with 
bonds used to cover the construction overruns, Illinois lawmakers counted on 
canal receipts to refill the state’s coffers. As it stood, the canal was mildly 
successful at attracting cargo, and produced steady profits. The prospect of a 
railroad in competition with the improvement limited the government’s 
enthusiasm for backing the Rock Island & LaSalle, regardless of its merits. When 
the rail line wished to incorporate in 1847, the Illinois legislature forced the Rock 
Island and LaSalle to agree to a series of concessions before it approved the 
charter. Most were relatively minor. Despite railroad efforts, one clause was 
potentially backbreaking to the new line, however. It required the railroad pay to 
the canal company a surcharge equal to the canal freight rate for all non-
livestock goods carried any length that the canal also served or up to twenty 
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miles west of its terminus. This surcharge was designed to prevent the Rock 
Island Line from syphoning potential business from the canal by driving up the 
cost past that of the canal, or failing that, to compensate the state if goods 
carried on the railroad. Legislatures were aware of how heavy handed this 
appeared. As a concession, the state allowed the railroad to subtract any such 
surcharges from state taxes at the end of the fiscal year. This anti-competition 
clause in its charter rendered the railroad much less attractive to investors, but 
even worse, this restriction was potentially financially backbreaking. As the main 
line of the railroad expected to follow the canal’s length, all traffic would be 
subject to this penalty regardless of the point of origin or destination. Luckily, for 
the Rock Island line, the canal executives’ own animosity towards the railroad 
helped remove the clause by the time the railroad opened, so it only retarded 
initial investment.19 
With a charter in hand, the Rock Island Line executive committee selected 
James Grant of Davenport as president of the incorporated Rock Island and 
LaSalle Railroad during its formative year. They hoped his widespread 
connections in both Illinois and Iowa would serve to shore up both public and 
government confidence in the project and ease finding investors. Importantly, it is 
indicative of the influence the city of Davenport wielded over the fledgling 
railroad. Although based in Chicago, an Iowa resident sat at the corporation’s 
head, possessing nearly sole power to shape the line as he wished. Celebration 
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of this accomplishment was somewhat premature, however. Work could not 
proceed until railroad subscriptions sold and began funding labor and iron.20 
Funding the Railroad 
By 1847, funding efforts for the Rock Island and LaSalle had begun in 
earnest, after suffering from a rough start. It was imperative, however, that these 
efforts accelerated. Another clause built into its charter by Illinois legislators, wary 
of another paper railroad, required the railroad to produce stock subscriptions 
totaling $150,000 within a year’s time or face revocation of its charter and the full 
$300,000 before they could begin construction. Confident that they could make 
this deadline, the executive board sought funds, using all of standard railroad 
methods. They petitioned the U.S. government for a land grant; approached the 
state of Illinois for funding; sought out private investors, both on the East Coast 
and in Chicago, for capital; and offered subscriptions to the citizens of Illinois 
towns on or near the Rock Island Line’s path. However finding funding proved 
difficult.21 
The state of Illinois was unenthused about providing the railroad with any 
funds. As discussed earlier, cost overruns and construction complications of the 
canal soured the state on providing funding for improvement projects. There was 
also the issue of a number of ‘paper railroads’ in the state. Legislators had 
already provided for numerous railroads in the eastern section of the state. Many 
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such rail lines proved to be largely worthless, existing only on paper or falling far 
short of their promised routes. All told, the state invested and largely lost 
$10,000,000 over the course of the 1830s and early 1840. This had placed 
significant strain on the growing state’ finances and threatened its ability to 
borrow in case of a calamity. When the Rock Island Line sought funds, it found 
itself rebuffed. The Illinois government had little appetite for more iron horse 
adventures. 22 
Finding investment at the municipal level was just as difficult. As a local 
railroad would greatly boost the economy of a town, typically those along planned 
routes were excited and willing to invest. The executives anticipated it would be 
simple to sell the Rock Island Line to the people of Illinois, particularly the 
communities most likely to benefit the most. However, the majority of Illinois’ 
citizens either seemed willing to wait for the railroad without risking their own 
money, or already had subscribed to one of the many of the railroads slowly 
creeping their way across the state and unable to finance the stock of another 
road. Even when community leaders seemed willing, they often hedged their bets 
against committing funds. Henry County, the area standing to gain the most out 
of the Rock Island Line, initially backed the rail-line with a $25,000 subscription 
promise. The county supervisors complicated the commitment, however, with a 
referendum clause, which required a vote to affirm the county residents 
supported the action. When the vote failed, the Rock Island Line rapidly reacted. 
R.P. Morgan, chief engineer of the railroad, personally held a meeting to shore 
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up support in Henry County, noting that the while east to west rail lines were 
going to be built regardless of Henry County’s support, there was no guarantee 
that railroads lines other than the Rock Island would build nearby. Other lines 
could simply follow along the Great Lakes or go further south in Illinois. While 
these efforts did not change the overall vote, the Rock Island Line executives did 
manage to raise private subscriptions in the county equal to the originally 
proposed amount. The county level was not the only complicating factor. Even 
towns along the proposed route, whose investment in the railroad was assured, 
could destabilize the entire effort via local political conflict. A collection of smaller 
communities in LaSalle County, IL attempted to divert the rail line completely 
from Peru, IL under the pretense that their proposed route was shorter. The 
railroad recognized that while this was true the grade of the altered route was 
much less friendly to construction. With the counties and cities of Illinois bickering 
and hedging, the Rock Island Line could not count on strong support from Illinois 
interests outside of Rock Island itself.23 
Acquiring funding for the railroad from eastern capitalists proved to be just 
as problematic as it was from Illinois. Eastern bankers were more than willing to 
fund further railroads in Illinois, provided they connected with Chicago. The Rock 
Island line in its original charter did not, again partially to assuage canal interests. 
The Rock Island reproached the Illinois legislature with the proposal, which by 
1852 was much friendlier to the idea. Illinois lawmakers believed that the canal 
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surcharge would be enough to deter the railroad from competing with the canal 
regardless of how their routes mimicked each other. The directors of the Rock 
Island Line were to catch a lucky break on this issue. As part of the charter 
agreement for the Rock Island Line, the canal’s directors had to approve finalized 
arrangements for the railroad to pay the surcharge and, once approved, provide 
unused public land near the canal to facilitate railroad construction. The canal 
initially favored this arrangement because the railroad would serve the area 
beyond its reach, between the Mississippi and Illinois River, and feed business to 
it. When the Illinois legislature amended the railroad charter to allow direct 
connection to Chicago, however, canal directors schemed to crush the upstart 
rail line before its construction even began. Part of the agreement required the 
Rock Island Line to seek approval from canal directors for the rate agreement, 
and canal land the railroad sought for construction of the line. So in order to stop 
the railroad, all they needed to do was deny them the land to build. A mistaken 
interpretation of eminent domain led canal executives to believe the Rock Island 
Line could not apply it to public lands. As the canal frontage was all public lands, 
under their interpretation, all they would need to do was stall answering the 
railroad and it would wither and die. Things did not turn out as the canal directors 
had planned. When the deadline for the canal directors to approve the 
agreement passed, Rock Island Line lawyers went to work. The railroad was able 
to condemn public land adjacent to the canal for their right of way while avoiding 
the surcharge previously connected to the approval. By 1854, at least on paper, 
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the Rock Island Line had a connection to Chicago and eastern capitalists opened 
their wallets to the railroad.24 
Davenport Fills the Gap 
 Illinois state and municipal interests lagged behind in funding the Rock 
Island Line because they did not see urgency in its construction. Time and 
natural progress seemed to be on their side. With a number of railroads slowly 
building across the state, it seemed inevitable one would eventually connect to 
the cities along the proposed Rock Island Line. Why spend money accelerate 
what was going to happen regardless? The view from the other side of the 
Mississippi was not as sure. The people of Davenport perceived that they did not 
have this luxury. An Illinois railroad needed to line up to cross the Mississippi 
river at Rock Island for any benefit to occur to Davenport. Instead of gambling, 
the city of Davenport put all effort into ensuring that the line built from Chicago 
terminated in Rock Island. 
 Although possessed of enthusiasm, Davenport’s earliest efforts seemed to 
flounder. Iowa suffered from a lack of cohesive leadership and statesmanship, 
leading regional efforts to drum up support for rail construction to flounder. At a 
regional railroad convention held in St. Louis during 1849, Iowa’s delegation 
seemed to do more harm than good to the state’s railroad plans as a whole. 
Newspapers reported that speakers from Iowa were enthusiastic but inarticulate, 
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long-winded, and generally unhelpful to the cause of generating support for 
construction of cross-river railroads in the state. Likewise, subscription efforts in 
Iowa were equally unpromising. While assuring that stock subscriptions were 
coming along in a timely manner, The Davenport Gazette reported that Iowans 
outside of Davenport had taken up only about $2000 dollars in subscription, split 
nearly evenly between the Scott County city of Hickory Grove and Cedar County 
in general. The editors urged it was imperative for Davenport to get the citizens 
of Iowa City and Muscatine to support the Illinois line. To do so, boosters would 
need to show how linked an Iowa railroad proposal and the Illinois line were. 
Without the Rock Island line to tie M. & M. railroad to the forming national 
network, Gazette editors continued, the proposed M. & M. railroad was unlikely. 
Therefore, Iowa’s financial support of the Rock Island was critical to getting the 
central Iowa line built as proposed. As 1850 opened, was clear to the Davenport 
city leaders that stronger efforts to raise subscriptions and ensure construction of 
the line needed taken. They would need to lead by example. The city council 
began allocating money from the city budget to fund promotion of the Rock Island 
Line and Davenport as the logical rail point to connect the East and West.25 
  Davenport did much more than simply promote the railroad, and put forth 
strong financial support for a city of their size. An observer could have viewed 
this simply protecting an investment. Several members of the initial board of 
directors were from, or had strong ties to, the city. Even in Davenport, however, 
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support for the Rock Island Line was not unanimous at this time. Initially 
subscribing only $10,000 towards the railroad in January of 1850, still a hefty 
sum for a community its size, this commitment met with moderate resistance 
from a few members of the city council. They proposed putting subscription issue 
to a public vote and letting the wider community decide. The majority of the 
council rejected this, and favored instead keeping city financial decisions within 
the city council itself. Realistically however, Davenport had not taken on an 
abnormal amount of debt in support of the Rock Island at this time. Davenport 
had invested no more than any other community, and much less then some. As 
an example, Rock Island, IL made an initial investment of $42,000 one week 
after Davenport. Commitment from Illinois also trended upwards. After James 
Grant’s fund-pumping trip along the proposed route in November of 1850, 
subscriptions reached the $300,000 dollars minimum to open the Rock Island 
Line’s construction and everyone’s wallet began to open. No longer simply a 
paper railroad, with the minimum reached it could become reality. The city of 
Davenport’s support did not diminish even as the railroad reached the funding 
milestone. Davenport’s city council voted to increase its subscribed amount 
several times over the course of the next year. This total would eventually rise to 
about $75,000, three-fifths of the total subscriptions from Scott County and nearly 
1/3 of the original $300,000 total. Nor had Davenport simply committed merely on 
paper. In December of 1850, the city council petitioned the state legislature for 
permission to alter its city charter to allow establishment of an account to hold tax 
revenues for the future subscription payments. The city’s standing charter 
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prohibited such a long-term account. Additionally, as subscriptions came due, 
Davenport was prompt with its promised funds.26  
Countering local resistance 
  While Davenport was largely enthusiastic about the Rock Island line, this 
was by no means the general attitude of the state. Iowans, even close neighbors 
of Davenport itself, were by no means willing to support unconditionally 
Davenport’s railroad building efforts. Many Iowans, and their municipal 
governments, objected to expenditure of local funds in support of a rail line in 
another state entirely. In addition, other Mississippi river cities in Iowa saw 
themselves as logical river crossing points in direct competition with Davenport. 
While their claims were usually deficient in some way—difficulty of bridging the 
river at that point by current technology, grade problems building away from the 
town, or terrain hazards complicating construction--these locations firmly 
believed if given the chance they could serve as the crossing point. At stake was 
the chance to be the epicenter of railroad bound trade in Iowa. 
 Even Davenport’s immediate neighbors, who were likely to see ancillary 
benefits of a railroad based in that city, were not completely convinced of the 
wisdom of taking up Rock Island Line subscriptions. Davenport’s sister city in 
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Iowa, LeClaire possessed a considerable faction convinced that any commitment 
by any Iowa government to the support of an Illinois railroad was foolish.  Doubt 
circled about the returns that such a railroad investment would have, if any. They 
also questioned some of the information on the railroad put forth by unnamed 
boosters. Many believed that these Rock Island Line supporters were far too 
optimistic on the returns the railroad would earn, some of which were as high as 
32%. They also question the necessity of their involvement and cash. If the 
profits from the line were such a sure thing, why was the Rock Island Line unable 
to rely just on Illinois capitalists and desperately in need of Iowans’ help? Why 
should they support a railroad when it would only “likely” help the communities of 
Iowa? Besides, if railroad interests in Illinois were already committed to building 
railroad lines, all Iowa needed to do was patiently wait for them to reach the river. 
Additionally, even if the Rock Island Line reached across the Mississippi, it did 
not mean it would be useful to Iowa for very long. Nothing would stop other 
railroads from building to the river and stealing the traffic away from the Rock 
Island Line, leaving a dead weight of a railroad and worthless investments. Iowa 
should build her own railroads at locations convenient for the state, critics 
argued, and rely on short route steamboats, or ferries, to bring goods to and from 
the Illinois bank of the river if these did not match up with those across the river. 
Illinois had a railroad connection to Galena already under construction and was 
set to handle just that sort of traffic. Once the Chicago and Galena Line 
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completed, Iowans would no longer need the Rock Island Line and a bridge in 
Davenport.27 
 Rock Island Line supporters rallied to answer these charges. Boosters 
pointed out they had never provided unrealistic figures for returns, let alone an 
outrageous amount like 32%. Supporters had based true estimates of around 8 
to 18 percent returns on similar successful eastern railroads or those already in 
operation in Illinois. In answer to common the question of ‘why worry about 
where the Illinois line is built?’ Davenport supporters replied that it concerned the 
entirety of Scott County greatly. The county could not afford to let another city in 
Illinois, or even worse another state on the river, claim the crown of possessing 
the East to West crossing point for the nation. If this happened, goods would 
route to this point and away from Scott county and any less reliable river 
shipment points. Building the Rock Island Line quickly, in conjunction with 
building a railroad in Davenport, prevented this occurrence. Being the first 
crossing point would put Davenport in the best position to become the strongest 
crossing point. Not only would Davenport prosper, but all nearby communities as 
well. Once the bridge was established, branch lines would naturally spread out 
from the railroad, inevitably sharing all the benefits of the railroad to Scott County 
and beyond. However, this meant insuring the construction of the Rock Island 
Line proceeded in a manner beneficial to the Rock Island Line and Davenport. 
Although there was mistrust of having the Rock Island Line based in Illinois and 
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outside of Iowa’s control, seeking to place laborious construction clauses would 
only doom the line. That a few cities withheld their support unless the charter 
stipulated the Rock Island Line started building from both Chicago and Rock 
Island, along with constructing the bridge simultaneously, bull headed and simply 
unworkable. Davenport boosters argued that there was no reason to start on the 
bridge until Iowa had managed to begin construction of its own railroad. 
Moreover, the construction of the railroad needed to proceed in a manner that 
allowed operations as soon as possible, so it could generate revenue to support 
itself. This meant building from Chicago and beginning operation as the line 
completed track. Iowans needed to invest to make this happen, but also needed 
the patience to allow their investment to mature.28 
 In the short term, Davenport convinced voters of Scott County to support 
its vision of the railroad. However, this support quickly wavered under very real 
concerns of taxation. By early 1852, voters put pressure on the county to divest 
its self of the subscriptions or repudiate them. Unwilling to let this happen, but 
unable to convince others nearby to take up the burden, the city of Davenport 
decided to increase its commitment. The city council resolved to take on the 
remaining subscription burden, and the bonds involved, of the county in 
exchange for their entire interest in the railroad. This approximately $25,000 in 
subscription bonds represented a significant amount of debt. Davenport again 
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amended its charter to allow for such a debt load. By June 1, 1851, the process 
of transferring the bonds was complete. This left the city of Davenport one of the 
single largest non-bank investors in the railroad, and removed from outlying 
communities the tax burden they feared. Anticipating the increased outlay 
necessary to pay railroad bonds, Davenport began to sell bonds secured by city 
tax revenues on the New York market. This process continued into 1854. 
Construction of the Rock Island Line 
With the issue of funding taken care of, directors of the Rock Island Line 
turned their attention to beginning construction. This was not without Iowa / 
Illinois tension in its own right. In October of 1851, Rock Island Line directors had 
concerns about having enough labor to build the rail line swiftly. Part of this was 
the rapidly approaching construction Missouri and Mississippi railroad. Even if 
they largely shared boards and interests, both rail lines would be in competition 
for workers. Thus, labors in Illinois needed to be locked into contracts before 
work on their sister railroad syphoned them across the river and drove up the 
construction costs on the Rock Island Line. Additionally, executives of the Rock 
Island Line had become concerned at the speed other railways were building 
across Illinois toward Rock Island. Construction of the line needed to begin to 
insure that a local line, meaning one controlled by Chicago, Davenport, and Rock 
Island interests, possessed the river crossing. This worry was not unwarranted, 
as reports were coming in that eastern railways hoped to entangle Rock Island 
Line in their influence. This process had already begun as the Northern Indiana 
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Line connected to the partially completed Rock Island Line in January of 1852. 
The Rock Island Line accelerated construction. By that October, the partially 
completed railroad began regular operation of its own engines.29 
 Railroad construction continued apace, reaching La Salle, Illinois in March 
of 1853 and the city of Peru shortly thereafter. Cash problems and repairs 
required due to spring flooding forced a delay in construction of several months 
to allow operations to bring in needed funds. Charging fares to secure operating 
revenue was more difficult than anticipated, however, simply because of a lack 
currency in the Midwest. Many of the earliest fares on the route, either passenger 
or freight, were conducted in exchange for goods rather than species. While this 
prevented empty loads, it also placed additional pressure on subscribers to 
produce payments on time or even in advance. This likely contributed to decision 
Scott County’s decision to transfer its Rock Island Line bonds to Davenport. 
Finally, in early 1854, the city of Davenport’s efforts finally paid off. The Rock 
Island Line completed construction to Rock Island, IL on February 22, 1854, just 
hours ahead of the first train scheduled to arrive. Locals held a large celebration 
in both Rock Island and Davenport to commemorate the achievement of building 
the rail line. Railroad executives conducted a much larger, nationally focused, 
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celebration of rail lines connecting the East Coast with the Mississippi on June 5, 
1854 with former president Millard Fillmore and other notables in attendance.30 
Davenport’s Will for a Railroad 
 While by no means the sole source of support for the Rock Island Line, 
Davenport provided the steadiest bastion in Iowa. Why would Davenport put so 
much money and effort into the creation of a line in another state? Simply put, 
Davenport envisioned itself as a gateway to the American West. In order to 
realize this vision, the city needed the Rock Island Line to complement the 
Mississippi & Missouri Railroad and connect it to the larger economic web of the 
nation. Davenport’s boosters could not assure construction of a Mississippi river 
crossing at their city, no matter how favorable it was a construction site, without 
having a railroad in Illinois at least partially under their control. Any number of 
other Iowa cities, such as Burlington and Dubuque had already shown their 
desire for a railroad crossing. Relatedly, without a connection across the river, 
the Mississippi and Missouri railroad would decline rapidly in importance. Traffic 
would have flowed to rail lines that did cross the river, leaving Davenport merely 
a trunk line on the network they had labored so hard to bring into being. Finally, 
Davenport saw the investment in the Rock Island Line as a favorable money 
making enterprise. Chicago was rapidly becoming an economic hub connecting 
the West with New York, and railroads connecting to it such as the Galena and 
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Northern Illinois line were proving to have lucrative returns. Investing heavily in 
the rail did not seem to pose a strong risk, and could turn into a mighty gain for 
the city. All Davenport needed to do was ensure the M. & M. Railroad built across 
Iowa and the railroad bridge across the Mississippi operated smoothly. Both 
seemed like simple enough endeavors. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
Bringing the Railroad to Iowa 
 In many ways, planning the M. & M. railroad was far more complex than 
planning for the Rock Island Line, simply due to location. A railroad in Illinois had 
many things already going for it: a quickly growing market and population to 
serve, connections to the east via the Great Lakes to bring over both materials 
and goods, and increasing amounts of native capital willing to fund such 
endeavors. A railroad in Iowa, however, presented a seemingly insurmountable 
pile of hindrances. The barely settled land caused investors to question the need, 
any pre-existing markets were largely orientated south to St. Louis instead of 
east to New York, and anything that required national input, such as land grants, 
proved increasingly problematic as sectionalism built to a crescendo prior to the 
Civil War. For a town of under 5000 people to have contemplated successfully 
organizing not one, but two, railroads seemed absurd. Nevertheless, several 
factors worked in Davenport’s favor. First, while settlement in the state was 
sparse, its pattern was important. When the state territory officially opened to 
Americans, Iowans built along the navigable rivers, such as the Des Moines, 
Missouri, and of course the Mississippi, and quickly developed a patchwork of 
settlement along the outside of the state waiting to fill in from either side. This of 
course assumed that some form of reliable transportation, not necessarily a 
railroad, crossed the state from east to west. Second, eastern railroads 
increasingly looked for a way across the Mississippi to access the West. Iowa 
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was right in the path of most of the logical routes to construct a transcontinental 
railroad to the West. Third, the vast majority of Americans, and Iowans in 
particular, were in love with the concept of the railroad and the economic 
bounties they believed it could bring. This made Iowans willing to invest far more 
heavily in railroad construction than might have been prudent.  
Planning for the Missouri and Mississippi 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the 1844 meeting at George 
Davenport’s house led to the creation of two railroads. Nearly concurrently with 
the chartering and formation of the Rock Island Line in Illinois, Davenport 
residents petitioned the state government of Iowa for permission to build a 
railroad of their own. On October 25, 1847, the first version of the Mississippi and 
Missouri Railroad came in to being, at least on paper. This initial charter only had 
three executive members, Antoine LeClaire, G. C. B. Mitchell, and James Grant. 
Ambitiously, the railroad had a capital stock cap of two million dollars, compared 
to the initial cap of the Rock Island Line of one million. In order to entice the 
Federal Government to assist in construction of the road, another provision 
indicated that in exchange for a land grant, the railroad would obligate itself to 
carry both mail and military goods free of charge. Finally, keeping with the 
general distaste that Iowans seemed to have for corporations, a provision also 
stated that the railroad would exist for twenty years and then have its 
continuance rest on the good graces of the Iowa Assembly. This particular 
charter, while not used in 1853, was indicative of the ambitious nature of 
47 
 
Davenport’s railroad designs and the mood of Iowa towards railroads as a whole. 
The planned capitalization was especially bold considering the low settlement 
numbers for the city and state at the time. Population figures for Davenport in 
1847 are not available, but even if taken out to 1850, the census estimated the 
city’s population at less than 2000 residents. Even though Davenport was one of 
the largest cities in Iowa and expected to spread this capitalization across the 
rest of Iowa and bankers out east, this investment represented a potential 
planned commitment of $1000 per resident of the city. Even allowing that 
Davenport did not plan to self-fund the railroad and was going to fall back on the 
state government of Iowa for capital, the amount was still daunting. If the entire 
incorporated population of Iowa as a whole in 1850 each contributed, the per 
capita amount would still be just under $100. These figures made self-
capitalization of the M. & M. by Davenport or even the State of Iowa unlikely. 
Funding the M. & M. required city leaders to locate a diverse set of resources 
and convince them to build in what was largely a frontier. Davenport had to reach 
out to the rest of the state and beyond to bring Iowa’s first railroad to life.31 
 Convincing Iowans to support the construction of a railroad inside Iowa 
proved much easier than convincing them to help fund the Rock Island Line in 
Illinois. Iowa’s citizens generally agreed that that a railroad would greatly help to 
connect and settle the state, and having one constructed with all haste was the 
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wisest course of action. The route along where this railroad built, and which cities 
would be included, was the issue. Luckily, for Davenport, the city had advantage 
over many other of the communities. Davenport’s previous experience at railroad 
boosterism and its connections to railroad interests in Illinois allowed it an early 
lead in the endeavor, which allowed it to shape similar efforts in Iowa favorably. 
As early as January 1848, the General Assembly of Iowa passed a resolution 
that called on the state’s Congressional members to use all of their power and 
influence to procure a land grant to aid in the construction of a railroad from 
Davenport, via Iowa City, to a location somewhere near Council Bluffs. While an 
east to west railroad crossing across Iowa that was based in Davenport was not 
the only route championed, it held advantages from the state’s point of view and 
led to it taking the lead in efforts to procure federal grants to that state. Primarily, 
Iowans assumed that a trans-state east to west rail line would provide the most 
benefit to the state overall and by having planned its construction in the center of 
the state, that intrastate sectional wrangling could keep to a minimum. 32 
 The city of Davenport had a ready answer to the state’s desire for a 
railroad and re-incorporated the dormant Mississippi and Missouri Rail Road, this 
time with an executive board that largely mirrored the recently organized Rock 
Island Line. This rail line proposed to follow almost exactly the same route as 
proposed in the earlier resolution from the Iowa assembly, which was admittedly 
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vague. Additionally, a line starting at Davenport provided a convenient potential 
connection across the Mississippi for rail eastward once the Rock Island Line 
finished construction. Moreover, while Illinois legislators had yet to approve 
formally a railroad bridge across the Mississippi, the potential for, and 
advantages of, a railroad bridge at Davenport gave the location an early lead on 
other sites. This did not mean, however, that Davenport was a forgone 
conclusion for the trans-Mississippi River railroad bridge. While backing for the 
Mississippi & Missouri was building, it was only one of a number of potential 
routes. The other major population centers of Iowa also wanted a rail line, 
particularly one following the Mississippi, and each of them wished it to include 
their city. Nevertheless, Davenport did possess a clear advantage. By the 1849 
railroad convention in Iowa City, Iowa’s support for the Mississippi & Missouri 
Railroad seemed largely locked in, with a few caveats. First, the convention had 
resisted any attempt to incorporate a city name into the railroad. This left open 
the possibility that nearly any east-west route might be chosen. Secondly, 
convention resolutions largely mirrored previous ones from the Iowa legislature, 
but also added support for a north to south line stretching from Keokuk to 
Dubuque via Davenport. This meant that any forthcoming land grant would have 
to focus on two rail lines instead of simply one. Finally, the language of the 
memorial had also become more confrontational, stating that Congress was duty 
bound to extend to Iowa the privilege of land grants for railroad construction just 
as had been done for Ohio and Indiana. This aggressive tone to Iowa’s request 
of the national government foreshadowed many of complications to come in 
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acquiring the grant. In any case, by early 1850, the majority of the state 
apparatus supported the Mississippi and Missouri Railroad, and to a lesser 
extent, the Rock Island Line, and saw it as a natural step to connecting the state 
to a national railroad network which was slowly coming into being.33 
 This did not mean that Davenport railroad interests could rest. First, they 
needed to find a way to help fund both railroads. Davenport’s city council 
continued to evolve their charter to grow the city large enough to support the 
impending costs of its stumping and railroad subscriptions. Additionally, until 
assured of the completion of the Mississippi and Missouri, Davenport’s citizens 
spent the next several years busily attending, and funding the attendance to, the 
various railroad conventions in the state. A.C. Fulton, James Grant, and many 
others redoubled their personal efforts to keep the support of the plan for a 
railroad built from Davenport had gained in the state. This culminated in the 
December 1850 Iowa City railroad convention, in which Davenport sent fifty-nine 
delegates and authorized $50 to help defray expenses. After the convention, 
everything seemed in order. The city council thanked A. C. Fulton for his 
services, notably his oration and efforts at keeping the event focused on the 
Davenport line. The M. & M. proponents hoped this convention had lain to rest 
the opposition inside of Iowa against the M. & M. Unfortunately, opposition, both 
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internal to Iowa and at a national level, would dog the construction of the M. & M. 
until after the Civil War.34 
Keeping the cities of Iowa behind Davenport’s railroad plans, even with 
the general support of the state government proved difficult. Several other 
communities had grown during the 1840s into locations of business significance 
that outstripped Davenport. These towns, such as Keokuk and Burlington, were 
twice or more the size of Davenport and regional centers in their own right for 
cross and on river trade. Further, the business and civic leaders of these 
communities saw themselves as the natural right holders to a railroad, 
particularly a trans-Mississippi line, and the benefits it could provide. Each 
contested Davenport’s call for a railroad with their own proposals, either for a line 
crossing at their location, or for the M. & M.’s route to divert to include their city. 
Particularly troublesome was the City of Muscatine. While the M. & M.’s route as 
proposed would almost certainly include them, they were not about to leave it to 
chance. Their delegation attempted to insert Muscatine as a required stopping 
point for the line at the last moment into the Mississippi & Missouri resolution 
under draft for delivery to Congress at the 1850 convention. This nearly 
sidetracked the entire railroad convention, as it implied that the route was still 
under discussion. It was here that A.C. Fulton’s efforts to keeps matters on track 
earned him his city’s gratitude. Fulton managed to convince the convention 
delegates that the meeting’s mandate was not to change the memorandum, only 
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to approve or disapprove of it. Defeated, Muscatine’s delegation denigrated 
Fulton and other Davenport delegates in the newspapers. This was not the only 
time Muscatine railed against any internal improvement not including them as a 
benefactor. Muscatine’s prolific and very selective anti-railroad rhetoric spurred a 
political cartoon of some of their leading residents riding a bull charging an 
oncoming locomotive. Davenport was clearly not the only city that believed a 
railroad was its destiny.35 
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 The potential for sharp rises in land values along proposed lines 
particularly drew out the venom. The City of Burlington’s paper, The Burlington 
Hawkeye, followed this line of reasoning and argued that the M. & M. rail line 
would impoverish the state by making the government land too expensive to buy 
and therefore deprive the state of needed revenue. Davenport’s newspaper, The 
Davenport Gazette, fired back that improvement nearly always brought prosperity 
to a region, not impoverishment; simply looking at states to the east could prove 
that. Additionally, holding down the price of the government land would produce 
revenue for the state, as the railroad’s presence would ensure the land along 
their grant sold and therefore be put into use. Thus, the advantages of having a 
railroad far outweighed any dangers of rising prices. Reasons for Burlington’s 
attempt to stymie Davenport’s railroad efforts are not particularly difficult to 
fathom. In 1850, the city of Burlington one of the most successful of Iowa’s 
Mississippi River towns and a direct competitor for a trans-river rail crossing as 
well. Burlington leaders saw the rail lines moving across Illinois, just as 
Davenport did, and pronounced that they would soon build a trans-river bridge in 
their city. Their prediction proved true, as the Burlington crossing was only 
slightly more of an engineering challenge then the Davenport one. However, it 
would take until after the Civil War for Burlington to achieve its goal.36 
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 The competing interests of Iowa’s cities complicated even submitting land 
grant proposals to Congress. Davenport’s measure fell under attack in 
Washington by Burlington interests wanting to scuttle Davenport’s efforts and 
redirect the grant to a Burlington crossing, despite severe complications in 
access and topography with the Illinois side of the crossing. Dubuque’s 
delegation was also poised to launch competing legislation in Congress, 
proposing a trans-Iowa railroad to the Missouri via the mouth of the Big Sioux 
River. Dubuque’s opposition to Davenport’s grant was particularly dangerous 
because of Dubuque’s position across the Mississippi from the Galena, IL 
railroad line, which had completed building to Chicago, IL by 1852 and was 
already in full operation. However, the extreme northward position of the city 
meant that any rail bridge at Dubuque would be of limited benefit to all but the 
northern most portion of the state and therefore curtailed the rest of Iowa’s 
enthusiasm for it.37 
 By the State of Iowa railroad convention in February of 1852, Davenport 
realized that the internal fighting among the cities of Iowa jeopardized the already 
fragile chances of its land grant bill in Congress. The competing voices of 
Burlington, Dubuque, and Keokuk in Congress threated to either derail the bill in 
favor of their interests or kill any chance of a land grant altogether. They needed 
to forge a coalition. Davenport representatives therefore reached out to Dubuque 
and Keokuk and offered to couple the grant for the M. & M. line with the north to 
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south route those cities proposed, so long as their rail line also included 
Davenport. Both the Keokuk and Dubuque delegates agreed to this compromise. 
Iowa City’s delegation also naturally supported it as Iowa City, as the capital of 
the state, was already a planned stopping point for the M. & M. With the support 
of four of the largest cities in Iowa behind the bill, it quickly dominated the 
convention. With the Burlington railroad faction marginalized, the new railroad 
coalition rallied the support of the state again behind their congressional efforts. 
Iowans also made plans in case Congress chose to deny the memorial entirely. 
The convention’s delegates agreed to provisions for the State of Iowa to 
purchase and set aside required land if Congress refused the grant. With a 
completed memorandum in their hands, and provisions for if the request failed in 
agreement, it seemed that the M. & M. effort had settled all internal conflict in 
Iowa over the issue. Following the 1852 convention and a plea from Davenport to 
rally the state together to push the land grant measure through resistance in the 
House, most other communities gave up or scaled back their railroad grant 
efforts. Unfortunately, this did not prove the end of intra-state interference in 
congress for the land grant. Burlington proved a particularly tenacious opponent, 
enlisting Galena, IL interests to attack the bill in Congress, and harass 
Mississippi and Missouri railroad grants even after their approval. Iowans 
attempting to stop the grant proved to be the least of their worries however.38 
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Caught in the Sectional Contest 
 Increasing tensions in the 1850s entangled Iowa’s railroad land grant bill 
in issues much larger than an intra-state conflict. With Northern and Southern 
legislators forming sectional factions, accomplishing anything in Congress during 
the 1850s was largely impossible. The stinging betrayal felt in the North with the 
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska and Fugitive Slave Acts, and the following 
electoral rebukes that killed the Whig party, ensured that anything even remotely 
resembling national cooperation unraveled. Northern and Southern legislators 
largely could not politically stand to be seen working with even members of the 
same party from the rival section. Even bills that should have received wide 
national support, or were typical bills only of concern local interests and had 
routinely passed, were embroiled in amendment after amendment. However, this 
North-South tension was not the only sectionalism that hampered the Iowa bill. 
Whigs and Democrats in congress blocked each other’s bills based party 
principles. Democrats were largely in favor of improvement legislation, while 
Whigs were largely against such “loco-foco” government initiatives and favored 
instead to focus on purely national concerns. Beyond even party politics, 
however, there was a growing rivalry between the eastern and western states. 
Older eastern states looked on with envy at the vast capital investment potential 
that the expansive lands of the west represented, while western states chafed at 
eastern calls to delay improvements until the western population naturally grew 
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to require the services these projects provided. It was into this sectional political 
storm the Iowa railroad land grant bill sailed, and it would take several long 
stormy years for it to return to the state’s shores with its bounty. The difficulty 
their proposal encountered was a surprise to the people of Davenport. While 
Davenport was not blind to the sectional implications and complications its 
railroad grant would entail, city leaders had simply believed them to be mostly 
economic, would come from the riverboats, and be easily overcome by an appeal 
to eastern lawmakers allied in with the railroads. Iowans also firmly believed their 
railroad land grant requested no more than any other state in recent memory had 
asked for. Iowa had only asked for enough land for a pair of railroads, the 
Mississippi & Missouri and the Keokuk & Dubuque, which paled in comparison to 
the amounts of land granted for the numerous railroads and canal projects in 
Ohio or neighboring Illinois. Davenport believed Iowa’s memorandum would 
swiftly pass through congress, and were somewhat unprepared for the difficulties 
arrayed against it.39 
 The first complication came from an even more unexpected quarter, one 
of Iowa’s own senators. In the middle of sectional tension produced while 
Congress grappled over the admission of California into the United States, Iowa’s 
Senator Augustus Dodge introduced legislation for the Mississippi and Missouri 
railroad, almost exactly as specified by the request of the state. He had made 
only one small change, the omission of exactly where this railroad was to start. 
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Unfortunately, no firm reason survives for why Senator Dodge made this change, 
but examining his background might shed some light on his motives. In the late 
1830s, Dodge had moved to the Iowa Territory to take up the post of Register of 
the U. S. Land Office, which was located in Burlington, Iowa. Dodge also had a 
rapid rise through the Democratic Party apparatus of Burlington. He was elected 
alderman of the city and the Iowa territory delegate to Congress in 1840 and as 
full Senator in 1848 after Iowa achieved statehood. Dodge might have felt 
beholden to the City of Burlington, Davenport’s longest and strongest competitor 
for a railroad crossing. With Dodge’s such strong ties to Burlington, deducing that 
the omission of Davenport as the agreed upon starting point for the railroad was 
intentional is possible. With this omission, Dodge potentially attempted to win for 
Burlington in the national arena the fight they had lost on the state level.40 
 Unfortunately, for all Iowa parties, the lack of a clear starting point for the 
railroad in the Iowa bill opened it to the mercy of an increasingly sectional 
Congress. As Iowa was a border state in this conflict, both Northern and 
Southern partisans made efforts to move the railroad either further north to 
Dubuque, or south to Keokuk. By doing so, they hoped to deny any secondary 
benefits to the other section. As the political tug of war commenced over its 
request, an alarmed Davenport city council funded sending a delegation to 
Washington in an attempt to put the bill back on track. They met with very limited 
success. Iowa’s Congressional delegations received mixed signals from the 
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competing interests in their state and therefore were more interested in what 
sectional and party goals they could accomplish with the bill. Further, Davenport 
had little hope that they could make that the rest of the state see reason. It 
already felt betrayed for having to link their land grant request to a Keokuk and 
Dubuque line. The skirmish breaking out in Congress over the land grand only 
made their opinion of their fellow Iowans that much worse. Davenport felt nearly 
abandoned as northern and southern sections of the state attempted to hijack the 
bill. By July 1850, a version of the bill unpalatable to Davenport seemed likely to 
pass. While Davenport was again the starting point of the railroads, the bill 
contained several problems. First, the language of the bill called the grant land 
grant a “donation.” Iowans bristled, as they saw the land grant as a natural right 
due to it as a state of the Republic. Secondly, the bill required the M. & M. 
railroad to start construction at both Davenport and Council Bluffs 
simultaneously. This was problematic because it almost ensured failure for the 
railroad. Any line built west to east from Council Bluffs would have sat unused, 
and therefore would be unable to help fund further construction, until it reached 
Des Moines. Third, the bill required the railroad to be a public road, not a 
corporation, resting its operations costs and maintenance on the state. Finally, 
the unused or unsold portions of the land grant were to revert to the U.S. 
government in ten years. Hoping to change the bill back to a form more 
palatable, Davenport elected James Grant to go to Washington and protect the 
city’s interests there. While Grant was largely unable to accomplish the city of 
Davenport’s goals in Washington, while he was there the bill as proposed failed 
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to move forward. The Iowa bill languished in political torpor for nearly the next 
two years, only to see a different sort of sectionalism threaten to kill it 
completely.41 
 Hope brewed for the Iowa land grant in late 1851 and Representative 
Clark of Iowa proposed a version of the Iowa railroad land grant bill in the House 
that was close to the original Davenport proposal. At the same time, a nearly 
identical version of the bill enjoyed fair support in the Senate as well. As debate 
on the bill dragged on into 1852, however, the land grant encountered its next 
challenge, the older eastern states. While the onset of the Civil War has rightfully 
occupied the majority of historians’ attention, the American political landscape of 
the 1850s was more complex than simply being a conflict between the states 
over slavery. Sectional tensions did command the majority of the nation’s political 
attention, but eastern states also looked on with jealousy as western states used 
grants of public land to fund railroad construction. During the previous two 
decades, eastern states had exhausted their own land grants to build canals and 
toll ways, and now wished to build railroads. The absence of federal land grants 
forced these states to self-fund much more of the construction costs of their rail 
lines in the 1840s and 50s. Additionally, eastern states were fearful that the rapid 
improvements would accelerate the immigration of their population to the western 
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states. To counter these concerns, these eastern states worked to slow or stop 
land grant legislation that would benefit the west.42 
Senator Underwood from Kentucky conceived of a method for winning 
eastern approval of the land grants that the western states so dearly wanted. He 
proposed an amendment to the Iowa bill that would share the western land 
bounty with the eastern states by giving them title to a proportion of it. Granting 
ownership of land to a state different than the one in which the parcel resided 
was not unprecedented. Congress had previously settled a border dispute 
between Kentucky and Tennessee in this manner, having granted one monetary 
and tax control of section while giving the other political enfranchisement. This 
solution appalled most western states and Davenport’s supporters. The editors of 
the newspaper The Democratic Banner in Davenport feared that this would allow 
eastern states to retard the growth of their western counterparts by withholding 
their land grants from sale or development and choke the western states of tax 
revenue. While this amendment died in both the House and the Senate, 
momentum was building at the state level to settle the western land grant 
practices in general. This created a political vise that squeezed the main 
opponents of federal land grants, the Whig party. Whigs were largely against 
such “loco-foco” improvements that required the largesse of the federal 
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government, but those in western states found the issue increasingly politically 
unpalatable and were tired of fighting the issue.43 
 This set the stage for the final major act of the east vs. west conflict over 
land grants. In April of 1852, Senator Henn of Iowa attacked the entire debate 
process miring the Iowa land grant bill and others like it, denouncing any 
objection to the land grants as self-serving and false. The most common eastern 
objection was based on potential loss of federal revenue. The federal 
government would lose revenue, opponents argued, as settlers bought up the 
land grant land near the improvements instead of federally held lands. Henn 
declared any opposition to the land grants on this basis to be a sham. He argued 
that nearby government lands that were not part the grant would more than 
double in value from the nearby improvements. Railroad land grants were an 
investment, not a drain. While this argument may or may not have been 
completely compelling, the spectacle of it did seem to give western Whigs the 
political out they required. By late 1852, Iowa won approval for its land grant, if 
more from having exhausted the opposition than having built a strong base of 
approval. With the land grant in hand, the Mississippi & Missouri Railroad finally 
began to take shape.44 
 One thing had become abundantly clear to the railroad interests in 
Davenport during their efforts to encourage Iowans to invest in the construction 
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of the Rock Island Line, that there was limited funding available in Iowa for 
railroad construction. Additionally, Davenport had been too successful in touting 
the M. & M. as a future link in an intercontinental rail line. Railroad proponents 
from other Iowa cities believed that a rail line serving such an obvious national 
interest would receive bountiful federal land grants and outside funding. These 
cities wished to direct native Iowa capital to more “local” projects. While 
Davenport proponents such as A.C. Fulton stated that Davenport was willing to 
“go it alone” on building a railroad, such a sentiment was mostly bravado. The 
city of Davenport, while it had grown and developing quickly, by 1850, only 
possessed a municipal income of $10,000 a year. In order to fund the M. & M., 
Davenport would have to both grow their tax base and keep other Iowans 
focused on investment in the M. & M. railroad.45 
 The City of Davenport’s primary plan to handle the increasing debt load 
brought on by railroad commitments was simply to grow. The city’s expansion 
efforts included the absorption of several smaller satellite communities, smaller 
towns that had sprung up around Davenport in the early 1840s. These towns 
included the closely connected North and West Davenports and the remains of 
their old rival city, Rockingham. These municipal land grabs, coupled with natural 
growth of the city population and continued immigration, increased Davenport 
from a population of 1,848 in 1850, to 3,500 in 1852. By 1854, Davenport had 
reached 6,000 people, tripling in size in just four years, all prior to the railroads’ 
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construction. This near doubling of population every two years made the city 
council confident in its ability make good on the substantial debt load from the 
railroad subscriptions. In an effort to avoid the uncertainty that occurred when 
Rock Island’s municipal government hesitated to invest in the Rock Island Line, 
Davenport’s council proposed to subscribe $75,000 in M. & M. railroad stock. 
Unlike the previous investment in the Rock Island Line, however, the city council 
felt that the voting public of the city should approve such a substantial 
investment. They had little cause to worry. During a ballot on July 8, 1853, voters 
overwhelming approved of the proposal, passing the initiative with only a single 
vote against it. History unfortunately does not record who cast the lone negative 
vote. Such strong support emboldened the city council. In July of 1854, they 
repeated their acquisition of railroad stock from Story County at large, and took 
on the M. & M. bonds just as they had bonds from the Rock Island Line. They 
were, of course, not alone in Iowa in investing in the M. & M. Railroad. Nearly 
every major community with a stake route of the railroad had substantially 
subscribed to its stock by 1855. A few of note include Muscatine ($63,000), Iowa 
City ($45,000), and the State of Iowa itself ($54,000), which is interesting 
considering Iowa’s distaste for state involvement in railroads. Iowans private and 
municipal investment in the railroad was prolific enough that the board of the 
railroad balanced in 1855, beholden nearly equally to eastern and western 
interests, with Ebenezer Cook of Davenport holding the position of president.46 
                                                          
46
 Davenport City Council Minutes, January 2, 1853 to February 17, 1853; Davenport City Council 
Minutes, July 20, 1853; Davenport City Council Minutes, July 21, 1853; Davenport City Council 
65 
 
 After over a decade of effort, Davenport was about to get the railroad it 
had fought so hard for. With charter, land grant, and subscription funding in hand, 
the Mississippi and Missouri Railroad was prepared to blaze an iron trail across 
the state and connect the land between two rivers both internally and to the world 
at large. In short order, however, that vision of an iron road across the state, 
along with its construction, ground to a slow halt until long after the Civil War. 
Construction 
 Davenport anticipated swift construction of the M. & M. Railroad following 
the approval of the Federal land grant in 1852, and hired an engineer to survey 
and grade the Fifth Street route the line was to take. Unfortunately, this early 
enthusiasm was somewhat misplaced. The directors of the Rock Island Line and 
the M. &.M. Railroad, largely the same individuals, decided to delay construction 
of the M. & M. until the completion of the Rock Island Line. The willingness of M. 
& M. to hold off on construction made sense for several reasons. As discussed 
earlier, Rock Island Line executives were concerned about both railroads 
drawing from the same labor pool, thus driving up the construction costs of both 
lines. Additionally, until the Rock Island Line was completed, a railroad line in 
Davenport would only encourage commercial concentration in the city 
unconnected to the Rock Island Line. With no cross-river outlet, the only real 
benefactors to this concentration brought on by the M. & M., besides municipal 
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Davenport, would be steamboat shippers affiliated with St. Louis or the 
competing Galena line via up-river shipment. This would have encouraged the 
growth of competitors to the Rock Island line in the long term and cut into railroad 
business. The potential to harm the city’s substantial investment in both lines 
might have served as strong enough discouragement to convince Davenport 
interests to support the delay. In any case, with a makeup of executives so 
closely mirroring each other, neither railroad was going to take an action that 
would damage the other.47 
 Once railroad crews began construction, the M. & M. Railroad line surged 
across Iowa at a rapid pace. In late June of 1855, workers laid the first track in 
Davenport and proceeded to race outwards from the town with the goal of 
reaching Iowa City via a slight detour. Muscatine’s relentless opposition to any 
route not including it finally paid off and the railroad directed construction through 
that city, reaching it by November. With this detour completed, the M. & M.’s 
construction crews quickly built westward, even as the Iowa winter threatened to 
block construction. Part of the driving haste of this construction was a bounty 
offered by Iowa City. If the M. & M. completed the line from Davenport to Iowa 
City by Dec 31, 1855, then Iowa City would reward the railroad with a $50,000 in 
cash premium. Like most monetary incentives, this prompted herculean efforts 
from the railroad and construction continued into the winter months. Cold, snow, 
and other weather slowed construction, however, and in the final week of building 
it did not appear that the railroad would reach the city in time. As night fell and 
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New Year’s Eve approached, crews had the train tracks within 1000 feet of an 
already constructed depot. Upon seeing the rail so close to reaching its goal, the 
residents of Iowa City turned out in force and pitched in to assist the crew in 
laying the final tracks of the line, despite minus 30 degree Fahrenheit weather 
and being able to avoid the bounty if the rail line did not reach the city that night. 
As midnight approached, the rail line was within 200 feet of the depot with a train 
engine slowly creeping up the track, when the steam engine froze up from the 
cold. Unwilling to accept defeat the citizens and workers used pry bars to move 
the engine into town. The combined citizen and worker crew hastily laid 
temporary tracks into the city and wedged the engine up to the depot to complete 
the requirements of the bounty. Iowa City and Davenport celebrated the 
completion of this link, and looked forward to reaching Des Moines and then the 
Missouri, dreaming of being part of a transcontinental railroad.48 
Davenport had been a significant part of successfully bringing two 
railroads into existence and looked forward to the swift completion of the railroad 
bridge and to the prosperity brought by business tied to the railroads and returns 
on investments into their stock. However, a number of internal and external 
factors slowed the M. & M.’s construction, realigned the interests of the Rock 
Island Line, and caused Davenport to reassess its relationship with the railroads. 
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Chapter 4. 
Complications in the Railroad Relationships 
By 1855, after long and costly effort, the City of Davenport had seemingly 
managed to accomplish all of its transportation goals. Having overcome the 
reluctance of not only Iowa but Illinois as well, the city had helped create the 
Rock Island Line. Quickly linked to other rail lines reaching both east and south, 
the Rock Island Line had become part of a national chain of railroads. Davenport 
had also already completed construction of its own railroad on the Iowa side, the 
Mississippi & Missouri Line. Here also the town had overcome strong objections, 
rivalries, and financial complications to ensure that the line had not only been 
started, but in a manner beneficial to the city. All that seemingly remained to 
cement Davenport’s position as the gateway to the West was to build the long 
envisioned railroad bridge across the Mississippi and then sit back and reap the 
bounty as both the goods of the East and the bounty of Iowa and beyond flowed 
through the city. However, problems of a scope and manner that Davenport 
could not handle loomed over the horizon. These problems would stunt the 
railroads benefits for the city. 
 The first potential obstacle was the railroad bridge itself. Overall, 
compared to building two railroads, securing construction of the bridge was a 
relatively easy affair. The federal government had legislated that the territory of 
states with rivers as borders extended to the midpoint of the waterway. This 
meant that in order to build a bridge across the Mississippi River at Davenport, a 
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company would have to deal with both the Iowa and Illinois state governments. 
Permission to do so was already partially accomplished due to some forethought 
by proponents of the M. & M. As part of the M. & M.’s charter, the Iowa 
Legislature had built in authorization to bridge the Mississippi River at Davenport. 
There had not been as much foresight with the Rock Island Line, given the 
piecemeal approval and extension of its charter, but securing permission from 
the state of Illinois also proved straightforward. This left only the details of paying 
for and managing the structure. In January of 1854, with permissions in hand 
from both states, the Rock Island Line and the M. & M. Railroad finally struck on 
a workable arrangement to fund and manage the structure. The Railroad Bridge 
would form its own company, jointly owned by both railroads, with a mortgage 
divided evenly between the two. In the event that either was unable to fulfill its 
requirements for funding the bridge’s operation and maintenance, the other 
railroad would assume full control of the bridge along with its costs. The largely 
overlapping executive boards no doubt aided reaching this arrangement. By 
March, construction of the bridge was underway by contractors Lou, Warner and 
Company and Stone and Boomer. 49 
Like most aspects of the Davenport’s railroad quest, the bridge project 
was by no means simple and quickly became caught up in the sectional issues of 
the 1850s. River interests, spearheaded by St. Louis cartels, which largely 
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controlled the riverboat traffic on the Mississippi, looked at the bridge with 
increasing trepidation. Not only was this bridge an economic competitor, but also 
the structure made steamboat navigation on the waterway hazardous. However 
as the bridge had a charter from both Iowa and Illinois, the only avenue left to 
attack was at the Federal level. Moreover, the railroads had left their opponent an 
easy opening to do so. The bridge company had largely ignored asking the 
Federal government if its use of abandoned military land on Rock Island was 
legal, so the steamboat interest turned to a powerful ally in the War Department. 
Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, already championing a plan to build a trans-
Mississippi Railroad in either Missouri or further south, agreed with his Southern 
colleagues, and ordered construction halted on April 19, 1854 under the 
presumption that it violated the military preserve of the abandoned Fort 
Armstrong. The bridge builders promptly ignored this order and sued the 
government in court over the issue while building the bridge, reasoning it would 
be much harder for a judge to order the removal of a completed bridge. Legal 
battles over the bridge’s right to exist would drag on until the late 1870s, well 
after the Civil War had stomped back sectional fires. In spite of the bureaucratic 
obstacles, on April 23 of 1856, workers completed the bridge. That evening the 
first train from the East crossed the bridge loaded with ten boxcars of consumer 
goods bound for Davenport and Iowa City. The following morning an engine with 
a single passenger car transported to Iowa its first travelers by rail as well. 
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Davenport had completed its vision and joined the great iron web swiftly knitting 
America together.50 
Despite sporadic difficulties keeping the bridge in operation due to its 
wooden construction, with occasional accidents and fires closing the bridge for 
periods, the bridge was everything Davenport hoped it would be. The city’s 
connection to the east thrived in ways both local and beyond. Formerly, crossing 
the Mississippi simply to do business or visit Rock Island in Illinois had required 
either a ferry trip during most of the year, or a dangerous ice crossing in winter. 
For such local traffic, the bridge was more than adequate. Large amounts of foot 
traffic, to the point where 836 people a week were using it in December of 1860, 
crossed the Mississippi on a regular basis. The true gain, however, for Davenport 
was in trainloads of food shipments back to eastern markets. At the dawn of the 
Civil War, Davenport already was shipping nearly 3000 barrels of flour east, 
along with 2000 bushels of corn and 195 dressed hogs. Only a month later these 
numbers soured to almost 7000 barrels of flour, 17 thousand bushels of corn, 
and 373 dressed hogs. Davenport had quickly become the processing center for 
the agricultural bounty of Iowa bound for hungry eastern cities and the armies of 
the Union. The editor of The Davenport Gazette heralded Davenport as the 
largest city in the state in 1860, with a population of 15,000, and possessor of the 
only railroad bridge across the Mississippi. By 1865, bridge traffic had greatly 
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eclipsed riverboat traffic, as Davenport’s railroad boosters had surmised it would. 
That year, over 300 metric tons of goods crossed over the bridge, about 55% of it 
produce and raw materials headed east. Multiple trains daily made the trek to 
and from both Iowa City and Chicago via the city. In comparison, only 860 
vessels of any variety headed up and down the river from Davenport that same 
year. The citizens of Davenport saw the Railroad Bridge as nothing but a boon to 
the city, assuming they did not have extensive ties to steamboat interests. The 
city’s municipal relationship with its railroads was much rockier, particularly with 
the Rock Island Line. Soon, the Panic of 1857 would stress these relationships to 
the breaking point, effectively ending one railroad and greatly diminishing 
Davenport’s hold on the other. This panic would not only fundamentally change 
the city’s relationship with its railroads, but also the relationship of the Rock 
Island Line and M. & M. railroad with each other. 51 
 The damaged caused in Iowa by the Panic of 1857 was partially of the 
state’s own doing. In the years following settlement, the state of Iowa had 
resisted the creation of banks in the state. Seeing banks as inherently unstable 
and usurious, hard money Democrats succeeded in inserting anti-bank language 
into the Iowa Constitution, which effectively banned them from the state. The lack 
of official banking institutions facilitated the growth of several “lending houses,” 
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basically large merchants, law firms, and banking agencies with both the 
influence and capital to make long term private loans using personal script. Cook 
& Sergeant (C & S) and Burrows & Pettyman (B & P), both based in Davenport, 
had become two of the largest in the state. By 1857, both C & S and B & P 
business script effectively acted as cash throughout the state. There was so 
much demand for its banking services that C & S had grown to include several 
branches throughout the state. These firms had ties with “wildcat” banks 
chartered in states nearby, such as Nebraska and Tennessee, which were much 
friendlier to unregulated banking then Iowa. By tying their script to the bank notes 
issued by these outside banks, the lending houses added legitimacy to their 
notes and allowed them to trade in a wider market. Unfortunately this link would 
also come back to haunt them. In 1857, a financial panic exploded out of the 
New York banking markets due to a large-scale withdrawal of hard currency from 
the U.S. by European investors and caused an immediate and catastrophic 
stress on these wildcat banks. Built largely on good will, economic exuberance, 
and future faith, these institutions rapidly failed in the face of economic 
uncertainty and took weaker traditional banks down as well. With two of the 
larger Iowa victims of this panic headquartered in their city, Davenport was at the 
epicenter of this financial crisis. Davenport hoped, however, that its investment in 
two railroads would be enough to see its devastated economy through the 
crisis.52 
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 Davenport’s initial faith in the Rock Island line was not unfounded. The 
railroad had contributed greatly to the growth of the city. Additionally, the city’s 
help in the financing of the Rock Island Line had provided a large number of 
indirect municipal benefits. Settlement around Davenport had vastly accelerated, 
and Davenport’s temporal “proximity” to the larger economic and political markets 
of Chicago, New York, and other eastern cities had greatly improved. The city 
had also received tangible economic benefits as well. The regular and well-timed 
trains brought national mail to the city and allowed Davenport merchants to react 
quickly to changes in the New York and Chicago markets. The eastern 
connection also directly created several local industries, such as thriving flour 
milling operations and hog dressing houses. Anticipating a long and fruitful 
relationship, Davenport had went as far as to construct the coal and wood yards 
required ahead of completion of the railroads to help cement their depot as a 
refueling stop. As the M. & M. was the Rock Island Line’s planned outlet to the 
West, and this arrangement made sense initially for the railroad. Davenport had 
financial reasons to be confident as well. The Rock Island Line had proven well 
managed, and the city looked forward to the prospect of eight to thirteen percent 
returns conservatively estimated from the $75,000 they had invested in the Rock 
Island Line.53 
 The Panic of 1857 caused severe stress lines to develop in the 
relationship between Davenport and the Rock Island Line almost immediately, 
however. Rock Island Line directors responded to the combination of suddenly 
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contracted money markets in New York, and damage caused by a rash of bad 
spring flooding, by suspending all dividend payments on railroad stock to ensure 
the line would be able to meet capital requirements and bond payments. During 
the same period, Davenport was looking to dividends from its stock holdings in 
the Rock Island Line and the M. & M. railroad to help it weather the crisis. When 
Davenport pressed for at least some dividend on stock, the railroad refused. This 
was also not the first time Davenport and the Rock Island Line’s directors had 
struggled over financial issues. Chicago and eastern interests concerned with the 
overall health of the Rock Island Line were already wary of the influence the City 
of the Davenport had on the line. As recently as the stockholders meeting of 
1856, Davenport’s Ebenezer Cook had managed to take control of the meeting 
and keep the railroad focused on building westward into Iowa. During the 1857 
crisis, eastern bankers were determined the Davenport would not be able to 
seize control of the meeting again. The Rock Island Line directors wanted to 
focus on the profitable routes between Illinois and the East, not the money-losing 
venture that Iowa was becoming. The condition of the M. & M. railroad’s 
financials fueled much of the issue. A string of bond and construction issues 
caused the M. & M. to rely more and more on its sister railroad. As the M. & M. 
became increasingly reliant on funding from its Illinois sibling in the years 
following 1857 for operating and expansion capital, the Rock Island Line 
management came to view the M. & M. merely as a branch line instead of an 
independent sister rail line. The Rock Island Line was willing to provide to the M. 
& M. the funds necessary to reach Des Moines, Iowa and pay half of the 
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construction costs to do so. However, there was also the understanding that the 
needs and interests of the Rock Island Line would take precedence over those of 
other stakeholders in the M. & M., including Davenport.54 
Withholding of dividends and a general disinterest in Davenport’s input 
into the operational affairs of the Rock Island Line were not the only indications 
the city that Davenport’s relationship with the Rock Island Line was souring. The 
railroad had begun wielding its economic might to make money at the city’s 
detriment. The Rock Island Line had set up the Coal Valley Company in early 
1859 in order to mine a coal seam near Davenport and provide fuel for both their 
and the M. & M.’s locomotives. Davenport had actually enjoyed a rather 
competitive coal market up to this point, with merchants from up and down the 
Mississippi as well as nearby mines in Illinois jockeying for sales in the city. 
However, in December 1860, the Coal Valley Company moved to corner the 
Davenport coal market, slashing its prices to eight cents per bushel. The citizens 
of Davenport had hesitantly approved of the move, as it would lessen their coal 
costs, and accepted promises that once the railroad company achieved 
monopoly it would not profiteer. Davenport was somewhat assured because the 
Railroad had done something similar in Henry County, IL and had not abused its 
position there. By 1862, however, the fears of the editors of The Davenport 
                                                          
54
 A.C. Flagg, “Extract from the Records of the Chicago & Rock Island RR, Oct 1, 1857”, MsC 159 
Levi O. Leonard Railroad Collection Box 42- Stanton, Edward, M., University of Iowa, Iowa City; 
Henry Farnham,  “Private letter,” March 1856, MsC 159 Levi O. Leonard Railroad Collection Box 
42- Stanton, Edward, University of Iowa, Iowa City; Committee, “Suggestion of Terms for 
extending the M. & M. from Grinnell to Des Moines,” 1859, Leonard Railroad Collection Box 43- 
Stocks and Bonds- Miss & Misso R.R. 1859-1864, University of Iowa, Iowa City. 
77 
 
Gazette held true. The Coal Valley Company in that year alone had increased 
the cost four cents a bushel for coal shipping less than thirteen miles to the city, 
prompting the paper to call for tis readers to send wagons instead.55 
Other benefits Davenport had enjoyed from its close relationship with the 
Rock Island Line also fell by the wayside. Previously favorable timetables and 
frequent train stops in the city, both easterly and westerly, slowly transitioned to 
mail arriving much later in the day and many goods deliveries and non-
passenger trains bypassing a stop in Davenport entirely. A change in schedule of 
U.S. Mail trains to and from Davenport was a particular worry for the city’s 
merchants. Before 1860, mail trains typically left Davenport at 6:55 a.m. and 
arrived in from Chicago at 6:25 p.m. Both times were well within merchants’ 
hours and allowed the flexibility to send a letter or purchase order to Chicago by 
noon, receive critical mail shortly after the close of business, and take shipment 
of goods potentially the next day. This schedule also allowed a commodity broker 
or merchant to make an offer in the morning and receive confirmation of sale in 
the same day. The timetables in 1861 were nowhere near as favorable. Trains 
left to and from Chicago much later in the day, with mail train arriving at 8:30 p.m. 
Merchants had to be a day behind on their mail or work late into the night after 
receiving it. As the Rock Island Lines’ interest in maintaining favorable relations 
with Davenport declined, so did its interest in economically supporting the city. 
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This led to a removal from Davenport of both the wood and coal yards and the 
jobs and tax revenue they represented. 56   
Davenport’s issues with the Rock Island Line developed due to lucrative 
easterly and southern traffic having dominated the railroad’s attention. While the 
Rock Island Line considered its connection to both Davenport and the M. & M. 
line from Iowa an investment worth maintaining, the Rock Island Line would give 
Davenport, or other Iowa interests, special preference in its business as it had in 
the past.  
Davenport had no more luck keeping control of the Mississippi & Missouri 
Railroad. If anything, the problems with the Mississippi and Missouri, while 
related to the Rock Island Line’s, were more dire. During the first few years of 
operation, the M. & M. Railroad seemed to be the economic engine the City of 
Davenport and State of Iowa had hoped. Products from farms in eastern Iowa 
flowed profitably to hungry markets in Chicago and further east while 
manufactured goods and settlers flowed westward into the state. At a nearly 
breakneck speed, the railroad pushed hard to its initial destinations of Muscatine, 
Grinnell, and Iowa City by 1856. Then progress slowly stopped. The M. & M. took 
almost another decade to each Des Moines and would never, as an independent 
railroad, complete its promised trek to Council Bluffs. Why did the M. & M. fail, 
when its initial push was so strong? Certainly, the panic of 1857 played a part but 
there were also other forces at play. A cool-to-hostile state government, 
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increasing friction with the City of Davenport itself, stock manipulation, and a 
Rock Island Line determined not to lose hold of its investment, all conspired to 
drain the independence, and eventually the identity, out of the Mississippi & 
Missouri Railroad. 
 While the state government of Iowa had been more than willing to wage a 
decade long push in congress for federal land grants to bring the M. & M. railroad 
into existence, the state believed its responsibility ended there. Iowa legislators 
were not willing to use state power and funds to enable the creation of private 
enterprise, and were traditionally leery of private corporations in general. Iowa’s 
general incorporation law in 1847 was one of the first such state laws in the 
nation and tailored to hinder the growth of corporations in general, and banks in 
particular. Even further, in 1855 Iowa passed a state law prohibiting county level 
governments from issuing bonds to fund railroads. This legislation had the effect 
of cutting off the M. & M. railroad from additional funding except for municipal 
bonds, which all came with significant string attached. Nearly all such bonds 
came with the restriction that any funds derived from the bond was only to usable 
in the construction of rail line to that city. This prevented the M. & M. from selling 
such funds to construct its main line, become profitable, and then go back and 
build branch lines.57 
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By 1860, the lack of faith in the M. & M. completing its obligations to 
Davenport and other Iowa municipalities was not unwarranted. Despite having 
completed building its rails to Iowa City and Marengo, the construction of the 
Mississippi & Missouri Railroad ground to halt between 1857 and 1860. Lacking 
significant continuing investment from sources both internal and external to Iowa 
and without significant revenue streams, the cash strapped M. & M. made only 
sporadic progress in reaching the center of the state and the city of Des Moines 
until 1865. The slow pace of construction was troubling to cities already along the 
M. & M., as the state capital had moved to Des Moines in 1857. Previously, cities 
along the M. & M. enjoyed a particularly close connection to the state 
government due to a direct rail line to Iowa City and were loath to lose that 
advantage. Economically more worrisome for the M. & M. and its investors was 
the simple fact that several other railroad lines were already making plans to 
converge on Des Moines and being a late comer would mean loss of lucrative 
early contracts. Still, Davenport did see the advantage of its connection to the M. 
& M. even if it was unhappy with the speed at which its trans-Iowa line built.58 
Closer to home for Davenport however, was the M. & M.’s inability to fund 
the maintenance and upkeep of streets occupied by its track in the city itself. As 
part of the agreement for use of Fifth Street by the M. & M. line, the railroad had 
agreed to surface and maintain the road in a state comparable to the other roads 
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in town. Almost immediately, this agreement ran into problems. Whether simply 
unable to spare the work force or match the expectations of the city, the M. & M. 
was unable to fulfill its end of the bargain. The railroad, in an attempt to head of 
further problems over the state of the road, reached an agreement with 
Davenport to give the city $50,000 in stock in the yet uncompleted western 
section of the line in exchange for release from any future obligations of road 
maintenance. Unfortunately, this meant that in order for the stock to be profitable 
enough to provide for the road, the railroad line needed completed to Des 
Moines. As it became increasingly apparent that the M. & M. would not reach the 
capital before the 1860s, Davenport felt that it had been deliberately mislead as 
to the value of the stock.59 
The aftermath of the 1857 financial crisis only compounded complications 
over Fifth Street. This brought the simmering issue of Fifth Street to a head. The 
city council, now nearly completely Republican following a political purge of 
Democrats in a state-mandated special election in April of 1858, turned its eye to 
the railroad’s property in the city to cover municipal debts. This occurred for two 
reasons. First, Davenport eyed the potential tax value of the M. & M.’s holding to 
replenish its depleted coffers. Secondly, it considered previous agreements over 
the use and maintenance of Fifth Street as highly questionable from a legal 
standpoint. After reviewing the issue, the council became convinced that the all 
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previous agreements with the M. & M. having to do with even the use of the road, 
let alone maintenance, had been beyond the power of the city council to make. 
However, Davenport’s mayor at this time, Ebenezer Cook, recognized that even 
if the relationship with the railroad was unsatisfactory, the city still had obligations 
to fulfill concerning until legally released from them. This touched off a legal 
battle in the Iowa courts, which left the issue largely unresolved until the post-
Civil War period. However, it would be another factor that spurred the Davenport 
City Council to divest itself of shares in railroads it no longer felt had its best 
interests at heart over the course of the late 1850s and early 1860s.60 
The M. & M. also had another factor working against its survival, Thomas 
Clark Durant. A friend and financing partner of the Chief Engineer of the Rock 
Island Line, Henry Farnham, Durant had risen to prominence in the Rock Island 
Line and M. & M. by providing a funding connection back to his father’s firm in 
New York City. Durant’s insider position allowed him in 1859 to arrange the 
purchase of $500,000 of the M. & M.’s land grant bonds at the favorable rate of 
$100 per month, with the option to double his investment if he wished at the 
same terms. Durant leveraged this option and became one of the major 
stockholders of the M. & M. line as the Civil War gripped the nation. As the M. & 
M. neared insolvency in 1862, Durant sued the railroad for even more control. 
The end effect of the lawsuit was that by 1863 Durant was effectively the chief 
officer of the M. & M. line. Durant, who would later go on to found the Credit 
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Mobilier Corporation with helped instigate the largest railroad scandal in the 
nineteenth century, used his power with the M. & M. railroad to amass a personal 
fortune. By leaking false information that the M. & M. would connect to a planned 
transcontinental line, such as the Union Pacific, and then selling his personal 
stock before the market realized that the news was false, Durant siphoned nearly 
five million dollars at the expense of the reputation of the M. & M. as an 
investment or going concern.61 
Davenport and other Iowa communities were not the only ones who had 
become concerned with the M. & M.’s weakening condition. As the M. & M. 
became weaker, the Rock Island Line attempted to stave off its complete failure 
to protect its already considerable investment in its sister railroad. Even before 
Durant set his manipulations into motion, the major stockholders of the Rock 
Island Line intervened in attempts to fund and preserve the M. & M. line. Joseph 
Earl Sheffield, one of the founding investors and partners in both the M. & M. and 
Rock Island Line, urged fellow shareholders to join him in surrendering bond 
coupons to allow the rail line operating funds to stay afloat. However, by July of 
1862, the M. & M. line essentially was without its own funds and required 
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assistance, about $7000, from the Rock Island Line to complete laying track to 
Grinnell. This effectively was the death knell of any independence the M. & M. 
possessed apart from the Rock Island Line’s direction. Early in 1864, the Rock 
Island Line and the M. & M. make a twenty-year operating arrangement in 
exchange for $500,000 more in construction funds for the M. & M. and essentially 
allowing the Rock Island Line free use of the M. & M.’s rails in Iowa. Finally, in 
1865, the Rock Island Line foreclosed on the bonds that the M. & M. owed and 
officially absorbed the line in 1866. Interestingly, the now “Chicago, Rock Island, 
and Pacific Railroad Company” reincorporated in Iowa instead of Illinois, but any 
pretense of local control by Iowa stakeholders, including Davenport, was gone.62 
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Conclusion 
With the Rock Island Line’s focus on more national railroad concerns and 
the dissolution of the M. & M. line’s independence, the saga of Davenport’s 
wholesale involvement in railroad construction largely ended. This was not, of 
course, because railroad building ceased. Davenport seemed to come to terms 
with the fact that it would not be the next Chicago of the Midwest, and had largely 
soured on the political and legal complications of railroad finance and control. 
Nor did the railroads simply vanish or cease operation in the city. The now 
merged Rock Island and M. & M. lines would continue to be an important part of 
Davenport’s political and economic character. Davenport and the railroad simply 
settled into a relationship more typical of most Midwestern market towns.  
Davenport’s rise from a river crossing on the border of America was 
marked by utilization of the few much less tangible advantages that the city did 
possess. Antoine LeClaire’s recognition of the location as perfect not only for a 
trading center with the displaced Native American tribes, but also as a haven for 
the wealthy of St. Louis to escape the malaria season. This initial commerce, 
when coupled with the straightforward ownership titles on land, provided enough 
of a draw to attract settlement away from its more economically advantageous 
resource extractive neighbors. Though the city never quite met its lofty 
commercial aspirations, in the end, Davenport had much to show for its efforts. 
Over the course of forty years, a combination of forward vision, political 
determination, and sheer tenaciousness turned a largely unremarkable crossing 
86 
 
point on the Mississippi River into a small vacation town, a local market center, 
and then into one of the largest municipalities on the Upper Mississippi during the 
antebellum and early post-bellum period. For a community of its size, 
Davenport’s effort and planning were astounding. Against all odds, the city 
managed to facilitate the construction of two railroads in two states, with the 
Rock Island line coming to be one of the signature railroads of the nation until its 
dissolution in the 1980s.  
Davenport’s efforts relied on more than simply maximizing its locational 
advantage however. James Grant, A.C. Fulton, Ebenezer Cook, and other 
leading citizens recognized that Davenport possessed a potential in the context 
of the railroad, but that railroad building at a regional level would need conscious 
and aggressive shaping to realize it. The long-term efforts initiated by Davenport 
were potent for such a small community. Not simply content to wait, the city 
utilized the connections of many of its citizens and reached out into Illinois to 
ensure that the rail line it required was not left to chance. Further, Davenport’s 
efforts to create and shape the destiny of the Rock Island Line put it in 
cooperation, and eventually conflict, with national railroad investment interests. 
Moreover, until the financial collapse of 1857 Davenport managed to keep the 
railroad focused on westward expansion, even in the face of the opposition of 
eastern backers who saw no profit in doing so. 
Interestingly enough, Davenport’s more local effort managed to put it into 
conflict on a much larger national stage. The M. & M. Railroad’s creation involved 
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navigation of not only labyrinthine local politics, but also the tensions involving 
old and new states and the increasing pressure of the buildup to the Civil War. 
Davenport’s nearly half decade long effort to obtain a simple railroad land grant 
exposes an America comprised of more than just a North versus South divide, 
but of additional increasingly antagonistic eastern and western sections. While 
the obvious national North versus South conflict understandably overshadows 
most other considerations for historians, just as critical was the effect 
Davenport’s river crossing efforts had on shaping the interaction of states in land 
grant matters. The Underwood amendment, and the debate it spurred, showed a 
nation that also had the potential to fracture along an East – West axis, at least 
politically and economically, if not in the catastrophic manner which the Civil War 
would entail. 
Finally, the loss of control and the conflict with the railroads in the city was 
emblematic of a process that the entire nation was going through. America 
increasingly had focused on national issues, national culture, and national 
commerce during this period. Events such as the Panic of 1857, the Civil War, 
and the increasingly transnational nature of the railroads themselves, worked to 
strip the isolation and primacy of local interests from what was arguably still the 
American frontier in near record time. Unable to maintain the focus on their town 
as eastern bankers and commerce increasingly dominated the railroads, 
Davenport’s citizens began a legal and financial retreat from reliance on the 
lines. Davenport came to recognize that, at least on transportation matters, 
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national forces far beyond its control were selecting winners and losers. 
Davenport instead focused on making the best of a lesser relationship with the 
railroads while it adapted and expanded the already extensive cooperation with 
its sister city Rock Island to keep its prosperity.  
Historians should not overlook the collective effect civic efforts in places 
like Davenport had on shaping regional and national events. This work has been 
only one-step in what may prove a long process to integrate local and regional 
history into the broader national narrative. 
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Appendix: Davenport City Fathers 
It is prudent to make a brief examination of several of the individuals who 
are central to Davenport’s efforts. Claiming that a few prime decision makers 
shape history is on its face patently false. However, it is equally false to claim 
that the choices of individuals, particularly those who find themselves in positions 
of influence, have no bearing on history. Davenport’s relationship with the 
railroads was far from inevitable, nor was it drug kicking and screaming into 
existence by men of will. A complex combination of social pressures, frontier 
enthusiasm, and leadership brought this relationship into being in its early 
stages. It is fair to say, however, that each of these individuals did shape, and 
benefit, from this process. 
Antoine LeClaire 
Antoine LeClaire was born in 1797. The son of a French Canadian trader 
married to a granddaughter of a Sac chief, he largely followed his father’s 
example and established trading relations in the Milwaukee territory while 
becoming fluent in a large number of Native American languages. His trading 
business gained him several connections to both Fort Dobson, the future location 
of Chicago, and St. Louis. By the Blackhawk War, he was working as interpreter 
for the both government and several of the tribes involved in the conflict. His 
heritage and connections afforded him several benefits as the conflict concluded, 
including land in the Half-Breed Tract from Chief Keokuk and a concurrent gift to 
his wife in the Davenport area. Honoring the terms of the gift to his wife, Antoine 
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LeClaire built a treaty house at the location of Davenport and effectively founded 
the town. While staying largely out of politics, LeClaire later leveraged his 
substantial land wealth to promote Davenport civic initiatives, including land to 
establish the county courthouse, and later donated his original treaty house to 
server as the first depot of the Mississippi & Missouri Railroad. Sadly, a broader 
insight into the man is difficult to ascertain as the family kept and destroyed most 
of his private, non-business, records.63 
George Davenport 
Born in England in 1783, George Davenport apprenticed to an uncle at 
age seventeen to become a sea merchant and traveled the world rather 
extensively. Settling in America in 1804, after breaking his leg during a 
successful rescue of a fellow drowning sailor, he shortly after joined the 
American military. The early 1800s saw him dealing extensively with Indian 
matters in both the South and the then western part of the nation. Davenport 
traveled much of the breath of the United States while in under military service 
before settling near the location of Fort Armstrong in the employ of the American 
Fur Company. Commissioned back into the military for the Black Hawk War as 
quartermaster, he was highly critical of General Henry Atkinson’s escalation of 
the conflict and its conclusion. His efforts in conducting the treaty negotiations at 
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least somewhat amicably for the Sauk earned him land gifts in both Illinois and 
the Blackhawk Purchase. After joining his claim to the town company and helping 
to organize its initial layout, Antoine LeClaire titled the city after him, both to 
honor his friend and to provide a more English sounding name to the town to 
encourage settlement and development. Much like LeClaire, Davenport 
concentrated primarily on business and civic matters. Davenport did not have 
extensive involvement with the politics of the city, and focused primarily on 
developing his business and land interests in both Davenport and Rock Island in 
Illinois. In July of 1845, a band of at least six robbers broke into his home on 
Rock Island, murdering him. Even with his death quite early in the process of 
railroad development in the city bearing his name, Davenport’s central place in 
both the earliest planning and development stages makes his inclusion 
necessary.64 
James Grant 
James Grant was born in North Carolina in 1812 and moved to Chicago, 
IL in 1834, where he practiced law and developed ties with the nascent railroad 
interests in that city. He moved to Iowa in 1836, farming in the Davenport area 
until 1841, until his election to the Iowa Territorial House, and later served in both 
1844 and 1846 constitutional conventions. By 1853, he had largely retired from 
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political life to focus on his legal practice as a judge and attorney until retirement 
in 1864. Interestingly, after retirement he attended engineering college and took 
up mining in Colorado until his death in 1891. He was instrumental in setting up 
both the Chicago and Rock Island and Missouri and Mississippi Railroads, 
serving on the boards of both and as the first president of the C & RI. Grant also 
used his considerable influence in Iowa and Illinois legal circles to Davenport’s 
advantage, advancing its causes such as mail routes, land grant legislation, and 
providing legal assistance to the city.65 
Ambrose Cowperthwaite Fulton 
Ambrose Cowperthwaite Fulton, born in England in 1811, moved to 
Davenport in 1842 and quickly made a name for his self, for good and ill. A serial 
entrepreneur, Fulton was involved in a large number of industries and land deals 
in the city, including dry mercantile, produce shipping on the river, and land 
speculation, often at odds with other leading men of the city. Fulton quickly 
became one of the chief agitators for railroad construction in Davenport and 
eventually the state. Self-promotional to a fault, Fulton earned himself as many 
enemies as friends in his endeavor and largely failed to gain any lasting power or 
benefit for his work on behalf of the C & RI and M & M Railroads. He did however 
eventually sit on the board of several smaller rail lines in Iowa. While 
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questionable in some regards, his autobiography is a wonderful source of early 
Iowa lore.66 
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